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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib—Civil 
Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. 
Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Abu Ghraib prison in central Baghdad has been called “one of 
the world’s most notorious prisons” because it is where Saddam 
Hussein’s regime tortured and executed countless Iraqi civilians.1 
Unfortunately, it has also become notorious because of the abuse Iraqi 
prisoners received at the hands of U.S. military personnel and civilian 
contractors.2 Pictures of stripped prisoners forced into humiliating 
positions or threatened with dogs have become an all too familiar sight 
on the news and Internet.3
Many of the soldiers and reservists involved in the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib have been reprimanded,4 a number have pleaded guilty to various 
crimes,5 and Specialist Charles A. Graner Jr., the alleged ringleader, was 
recently convicted by a court martial and sentenced to ten years in prison 
 1. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact. 
 2. See, e.g., id.; David Morgan, Abu Ghraib Probe Suggests CIA Role in Iraqi Deaths, 
REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2005, at http://www.reuters.com; Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military Says 
26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at A6; Neil A. Lewis & David 
Johnston, New F.B.I. Files Describe Abuse of Iraq Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A5; CBS 
News, Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (Apr. 28, 2004); MG Antonio 
M. Taguba, AR 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (May 27, 2004), 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/TR3.pdf [hereinafter Taguba Report]. Because various 
versions of the Taguba Report use different pagination, and because the document itself has 
inconsistent internal pagination, this Comment will refer to the page number of the PDF file from the 
ACLU.  
 3. The released photographs are collected and displayed on many websites. One of the most 
thorough websites posts the photographs at the following two URLs: 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/iraqis_tortured (last modified May 21, 2004); 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/iraqis_tortured/index2.htm (last modified May 21, 2004).  
 4.  See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., Interrogation Methods in Iraq Aren't All Found in Manual, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A5.
 5. See John W. Gonzalez, Prosecutions Wind Down at Fort Hood; 
No One Ranked Higher than Staff Sergeant Faces Charges in the Abu Ghraib Case, HOUS. CHRON., 
Apr. 4, 2005, at B1 (collecting data on the all of the soldiers charged in connection with the abuse at 
Abu Ghraib).  
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for his participation in the abuse.6 All of this is certainly a necessary 
response to what happened at Abu Ghraib. Still, because court martial 
proceedings are essentially criminal in nature, they generally do not 
provide a civil remedy for victims.7 Not only would providing a civil 
remedy satisfy the victim’s interest in being compensated for a horrible 
wrong committed against him,8 but because winning the hearts and 
minds of the Iraqi people is essential to the success of the United States’ 
efforts in Iraq, providing a remedy for the victims of misconduct by U.S. 
personnel should be important to the United States.9 And given evidence 
 6. E.g., id.; Kate Zernike, Jury Takes Five Hours To Reach Verdict in Abu Ghraib Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A1 (discussing court martial, guilty verdict, and sentence of Specialist 
Graner); Susan Candiotti & Jim Polk, Graner Sentenced to 10 Years for Abuses, CNN, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/01/15/graner.court.martial/index.html (Jan. 15, 2004) (discussing 
same). 
 7. See ESTELA I. VELEZ-POLLACK, MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL: AN OVERVIEW 3–5 
(Cong. Research Service, Order Code RS21850, May 26, 2004) (describing the three types of courts 
martial and the potential punishments under each). Court martial jurisdiction can be exercised over 
“persons with or accompanying the military in the field during ‘times of war.’” Id. at 2 (citing 
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL art. 2 (2002); 10 U.S.C. § 
802 (2004)). Civil relief is never mentioned as a potential punishment under the various types of 
court martial. See id. However, in their capacity as criminal courts, courts martial can either order 
restitution or consider it as a mitigating factor in sentencing. See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL pt. 
IV, § XI, R. 97a, art. 134 (2002) (allowing a court to order restitution as a condition of parole); id. 
pt. II, chap. XI, R. 1105 (allowing consideration of restitution in sentencing); 53A AM. JUR. 2D 
Military and Civil Defense § 262 (2004). 
 8. “In accordance with Islamic principles to intentionally or negligently cause physical 
injury to another, or to cause him financial loss engages liability in reparation as prescribed in 
traditional authorities.” S.H. AMIN, The Legal System of Iraq, in MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 
188–90 (1985). According to Professor Amin, the Iraqi civil provision based on this maxim is “very 
wide and comprehensive[;] . . . it omit[s] any reference to the concepts of intention, culpa or fault. 
Accordingly, all personal injuries should be compensated for under Iraqi law whether they are 
caused intentionally, negligently or otherwise.” Id. at 189 (citing CIVIL CODE art. 202 (1951) (Iraq)). 
Therefore, even if it was not emphasized under Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqis have a historical 
and philosophical justification for expecting compensation from those who mistreat them. 
 9. See Brian Knowlton, Anger Grows over Iraqi Prisoners, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 4, 
2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/518107.html (quoting Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, 
“If Americans are in Iraq to promote democracy, is this the way to do it?”); Press Release, Office of 
the Press Secretary, President Bush Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Martin to White House 
(Apr. 30, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/04/20040430-2.html (Responding to the question “How are you going to win 
[the Iraqi people’s] hearts and minds with these sort of tactics?,” President Bush stated, “I shared a 
deep disgust that those prisoners were treated the way they were treated. Their treatment does not 
reflect the nature of the American people.”).  
As this Comment was going to press, the ACLU and Human Rights First filed a suit on behalf 
of several Iraqi and Afghani detainees against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and various other 
Defense Department officials for their supervisory role in the abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. See 
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU and Human Rights First Sue Defense Secretary Rumsfeld over U.S. 
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of similar abuses by U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors10 at 
other locations throughout Iraq, in Afghanistan, and at Guantanamo 
Bay,11 the availability of civil relief for similar victims should be an 
important part of the United States’ prosecution of the larger war on 
terror. 
On the other hand, providing civil relief against U.S. soldiers or 
civilian contractors accompanying the military is also problematic. After 
all, the United States really is at war, and some damage and disruption 
are inevitable. This Comment will argue that the United States should 
provide relief for the victims of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and will 
discuss the potential avenues that should be available to the victims and 
the limitations on those theories. Specifically, it will discuss the Foreign 
Claims Act (FCA), a quasi-administrative remedy created by Congress to 
provide compensation for damage arising from the noncombat operations 
Torture Policies (Mar. 1, 2005), at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/ 
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17584&c=206; see infra note 11. The Complaint alleges violations of various 
domestic statutes, internal military regulations, the ATS, and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. 
Complaint, Ali v. Rumsfeld, available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=17573 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). The Complaint is helpful because it 
details many of the injuries suffered by individual plaintiffs. 
 10. Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6 (reporting that Specialist Graner testified that “his orders 
came from civilian contractors as well as military intelligence”). 
 11. See Neil A. Lewis, ACLU Presents Accusations of Serious Abuse of Iraqi Civilians, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at A10 (discussing some 4,000 pages of documents released by the Army that 
describe abuse at Adhamiya Palace in Baghdad by U.S. Special Forces, “as opposed to prison guards 
or interrogators” like those implicated in the Abu Ghraib scandal); Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, 
New F.B.I. Files Describe Abuse of Iraq Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A5 (discussing 
documents describing participation by FBI agents in the abuse at Abu Ghraib and documents relating 
to conduct at Guantanamo Bay that could also potentially amount to torture); Neil A. Lewis & 
Douglas Jehl, New Documents Show Prison Abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2005, at A11; Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks (June 17, 2004), at 
http://www.newsobserver.com/front/story/ 
1343133p-7466153c.html (last modified June 20, 2004) (discussing criminal indictments filed 
against civilian contractors for conduct in Afghanistan); Press Release, ACLU, Detainee Coerced 
into Dropping Charges of Abuse Before Release (Feb. 18, 2005), at http: 
//www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17515&c=206 (describing statement by Iraqi 
detainee who was threatened with indefinite detention if he did not waive his right to seek an 
investigation after being severely beaten by plainclothes military personnel, describing mock 
executions in Afghanistan, and documenting the intentional destruction of photographs to “avoid 
‘another public outcry’”); BBC News, US Accused of Afghan Jail Deaths, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4092073.stm (last modified Dec. 13, 2004). British soldiers 
have also been convicted by court martial for abusing Iraqi civilian contractors. BBC News, Two 
Soldiers Guilty of Iraq Abuse, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
4290435.stm (last modified Feb. 23, 2005). This Comment will only discuss the availability of relief 
to the victims at Abu Ghraib, but its analysis should apply to these other situations as well. 
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of the United States military operating in foreign countries.12 Because 
there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the FCA is often inadequate, 
and because the soldiers and contractors are immune under Iraqi law,13 it 
will also discuss remedies potentially available under U.S. law, including 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Bivens 
doctrine. 
Any discussion of civil remedies under U.S. law for extraterritorial 
torts by U.S. government employees or their agents is significantly 
informed by the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, a case arising out of the kidnapping of a Mexican 
doctor by bounty hunters employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency,14 
and brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS).15 Not only did this decision specifically limit the 
availability of the FTCA and ATS to remedy extraterritorial tortious 
conduct, but in intriguing dicta, Justice Souter suggested that the ATS 
should not “supplant[] the actions under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents16 . . . that now provide damages 
remedies for . . . violations” of the federal constitution.17 Of the statutory 
theories presented in Sosa and the constitutional theories hinted at in 
Justice Souter’s opinion, the FTCA will not provide relief against the 
United States in its sovereign capacity, but the ATS and Bivens doctrine 
should provide a remedy against the individual soldiers and contractors 
who participated in the abuse. 
Part II will discuss remedies available under U.S. law, including the 
Foreign Claims Act, tort suits against the government, constitutional tort 
suits against government agents, and the Alien Tort Statute, which 
provides a remedy for extraterritorial torts and is only available to aliens. 
Part III will introduce the Sosa decision and will discuss its ramifications 
on the remedies discussed in Part II for extraterritorial conduct by U.S. 
agents. Because Sosa does not rule out the option of constitutional tort 
suits against U.S. officers, Part IV will discuss United States v. Verdugo-
 12. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2004). 
 13. The victims will need to use United States law because the Coalition Provisional 
Authority immunized U.S. soldiers and contractors to prosecution under Iraqi law. See Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised) § 2, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ 
regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf. The 
inadequacy of relief under the FCA is discussed infra at notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 14. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). 
 15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). 
 16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 17. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768. 
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Urquidez, which held that aliens in foreign countries are not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, and thus cast doubt on the availability of a 
Bivens remedy against U.S. agents who conduct arguably unlawful 
searches abroad.18 It will then argue that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause is sufficiently different from the Fourth Amendment 
to justify a different result under the deterrent rationale of the Bivens 
doctrine. Part V returns to Abu Ghraib and considers how the theories 
discussed in Parts II and IV could be applied to suits by the Abu Ghraib 
victims against the various potential defendants. 
II. CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER U.S. LAW—FOREIGN AND  
DOMESTIC RELIEF 
The Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority has immunized American 
soldiers and civilian contractors accompanying the military from 
prosecution under Iraqi civil or criminal law.19 However, the Order 
providing immunity under Iraqi law also provides that coalition 
personnel are still subject to the jurisdiction of their “Sending State.”20 
Therefore, any remedies against U.S. personnel for the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib must come under U.S. law. In addition to analyzing the Foreign 
Claims Act, which provides claims commissions in Iraq (and other 
foreign countries), this Part will analyze the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
which allows suit against the United States; constitutional tort theories, 
which seek to hold a government employee or agent individually liable 
for unconstitutional conduct; and the Alien Tort Statute, which is only 
available to aliens. 
A. The Foreign Claims Act—Compensating Claims in a  
Foreign Country 
The Foreign Claims Act, which creates claims commissions in 
foreign countries where the military conducts substantial operations, is 
perhaps the most direct remedy for the victims of misconduct by U.S. 
soldiers. “The Foreign Claims Act provides for the settlement, and 
 18. 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990). 
 19. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. While this 
immunity technically expired on June 30, 2004, most of the abuses at Abu Ghraib took place before 
that date. See Taguba Report, supra note 2; Department of the Army, Certification of Taguba Report 
(June 4, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/ 
released/TR1.pdf. 
 20. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17, supra note 13, § 2(3). 
2BOR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
376 
 
payment up to $100,000, of a claim against the United States,” brought 
by a resident of a foreign country, “where the damage, loss, personal 
injury, or death occurs outside the United States . . . and is caused by, or 
is otherwise incident to [the] noncombat activities of” the United States 
military.21 It was enacted “[t]o promote and to maintain friendly 
relations through the prompt settlement of meritorious claims.”22 The 
term “noncombat activity” is therefore defined broadly and includes any 
“activity, other than combat, war or armed conflict, that is particularly 
military in character and has little parallel in the civilian community.”23
To further the goal of promoting friendly relations, procedures under 
the FCA are designed to be flexible.24 The Secretary of each department 
(Navy, Army, Air Force) “appoint[s] claims commissions, composed of 
commissioned officers, . . . to settle and pay claims ‘under such 
regulations as the secretary concerned may prescribe.’”25 There is no 
need for the foreign citizen to come to the United States and sue—claims 
commissions are usually established where the military has a significant 
presence, and claims officers have full authority to settle claims up to the 
full $100,000 allowed by statute.26
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Iraqis injured 
through the negligent or even criminal conduct of U.S. soldiers are not 
compensated for their injuries.27 Victims face a maze of procedures and 
 21. FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 73:193 (update June 2004) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2004)). 
 22. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a). The FCA does include a two year limitations period. See § 2734(b). 
 23. 32 C.F.R. § 842.41(c) (2004). 
 24. David P. Stephenson, An Introduction to the Payment of Claims Under the Foreign and 
the International Agreement Claims Act, 37 A.F. L. REV. 191, 198–99 (1994). 
 25. Id. at 193 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (1990)). For example, “[i]n the Air Force, those 
regulations appear in chapter 8 of the Air Force Regulation 112-1.” Id. 
 26. Associated Press, Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis (Oct. 24, 
2004) (“Army Lt. Col. Charlotte Herring said the Army, which handles civil claims for all three 
service branches in Iraq, has given out $8.2 million by June 2003 and budgeted $10 million in fiscal 
year 2005 to help Iraqis deal with losses suffered because of war.”), at 
http://www.civicworldwide.org/compensation/compensation-army-102404.htm; department of Defense, 
Defend America—Iraq Update (Aug. 22, 2004), at http://www.defendamerica.mil/ 
iraq/update/aug2003/iu082203.html. 
 27. See, e.g., Occupation Watch Center in Baghdad & National Association for the Defense 
of Human Rights in Iraq, Joint Report on Civilian Casualties and Claims Related to U.S. Military 
Operations, at http://www.civicworldwide.org/pdfs/compensationreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 
2005); Occupation Watch Center & National Association of the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq, 
Report on Civilian Deaths and Human Rights Violations by US Army and Uselessness of Claims 
Process (Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Report on Civilian Deaths] (“Lawyers for NADHRI have filed 
120 cases for compensation with the military, none of which have received compensation. 
Occupation Watch has filed 20 and logged more than 80, none of which have received 
2BOR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM 
371] Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts 
 377 
 
policies that keep many of them from ever presenting their claims for 
consideration.28 According to one Iraqi translator and claims processing 
assistant, “[o]nly [thirty] to [forty] percent get compensation.”29 While 
this low rate of compensation may reflect legitimate decisions by claims 
officers, it may also reflect budget constraints, military policy, an 
unwillingness to consider meritorious claims, or other nonmerit based 
considerations.30
The FCA includes a provision that “no claim may be paid under this 
section unless the amount tendered is accepted by the claimant in full 
satisfaction.”31 By implication, Congress realized that FCA claimants 
could potentially seek relief through other avenues, including suit.32 So, 
if Iraqis with meritorious but uncompensated claims could sue, what 
remedies would be available to them? Furthermore, what remedies would 
be available against the civilian contractors alleged to have participated 
in the abuse?33 After all, while the FCA potentially provides relief for 
damages caused by U.S. military personnel (limited by the combat 
activities and the full satisfaction provisions), it does not make the 
federal government an indemnitor for civilian contractors.34 The next 
Subpart will discuss the sorts of remedies usually available in U.S. courts 
for plaintiffs suing the government or its agents. 
compensation.”), at http://www.occupationwatch.org/ 
article.php?id=2579 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  
 28. Report on Civilian Deaths, supra note 27. 
 29. Orly Halpern, Running the U.S. Military’s Compensation Gauntlet, NEW STANDARD 
(July 14, 2004), at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/ 
2004/0714gauntlet.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). The military is also able to provide “sympathy 
payouts,” which are not treated as admissions of fault and can be paid for conduct technically falling 
within the combat activities category. Id. The “maximum sympathy payout for wrongful death is 
$2500, according to lists kept by the Iraqi Assistance Center.” Id. It is unclear whether this $2500 is 
capped by some policy, or whether U.S. claims processors consider this amount, which could 
provide food for a family of six for two years, as adequate compensation for wrongful death. See id.  
 30.  See Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis, supra note 26 
(discussing budgeted funds available to pay FCA claims).  
 31. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(e) (2004). 
 32. In other words, there would be no need to impose a full satisfaction requirement if injured 
aliens could not assert their claims in a tribunal other than FCA claims commissions. 
 33. Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6 (quoting Specialist Graner’s testimony that civilian 
contractors ordered some of the abuse). 
 34. The FCA does cover “civilian employee[s] of the military department concerned,” but 
this does not extend to nonemployee civilians. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a). 
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B. Relief in U.S. Courts 
There are a number of theories under which plaintiffs injured by 
government agents or activities can obtain redress in U.S. courts. The 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides a remedy directly against the 
federal government for most claims of negligence by government 
employees. The FTCA does not provide a remedy for claimants asserting 
a violation of constitutional rights by federal agents, often referred to as 
constitutional torts. However, statutory and judicially created remedies 
allow suit against individual government agents for constitutional torts. 
This Subpart will therefore discuss the FTCA and the Bivens doctrine, 
both of which specifically relate to suits against the federal government 
and its officers. 
1. The Federal Tort Claims Act  
 In 1946 Congress enacted the FTCA as a broad waiver of the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity and made the United States liable “in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.”35 It provides a comprehensive remedy against the 
United States for tort claims resulting from the negligent or wrongful 
acts or omissions of federal employees acting within the scope of their 
employment or office.36
However, Congress imposed a number of limitations on that 
waiver.37 For example, even though the United States is generally liable 
“to the same extent as a private individual,” it cannot be held liable for 
punitive damages or prejudgment interest.38 The FTCA also bars a suit 
against the government unless the claim is first presented to, and denied 
by, the appropriate federal agency.39 Even when a case goes to trial, a 
jury is not available.40
In addition to these general limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 lists a 
number of specific cases excluded from this waiver of sovereign 
 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2004). 
 36. It also conferred exclusive jurisdiction for such actions on the federal district courts. See 
35A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 1 (2004). 
 37. Id. (citing Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775, 779 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Congress may 
impose conditions upon a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit. Moreover such 
limitations and conditions must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” 
(internal citations omitted))).
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
 39. Id. § 2675. 
 40. Id. § 2402. 
2BOR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM 
371] Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts 
 379 
 
immunity. When one of these exclusions applies, the district court is 
without jurisdiction to hear the case.41 The most important exclusions 
include the discretionary function exclusion, which applies when injury 
results from a policy decision by an official charged with discretion;42 
the Postal Service exclusion for the Postal Service’s negligence in 
delivering the mails;43 and the exclusion for “[a]ny claim arising in a 
foreign country.”44 The FTCA also excludes most intentional torts, such 
as battery, assault, defamation, or malicious prosecution.45 However, this 
section was amended in 1974 to allow liability for intentional torts 
committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United 
States Government” to be asserted against the government.46
Another important limitation on the FTCA is that the United States 
cannot be held liable for constitutional torts committed by its 
employees.47 This limitation is largely based on the fact that while the 
FTCA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity, the underlying cause of 
 41. E.g., 35A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 33 (2004). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (providing that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not 
apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising 
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be 
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused”) (emphasis added)). The “discretionary function” exception has 
proven ambiguous. See generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–24 n.30 (4th 
ed. 2003). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). 
 44. Id. § 2680(k); see infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 45. The FTCA excludes assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract 
rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
 46. Id. 
 47. In the Westfall Act, Congress effectively provided absolute immunity for federal 
employees in negligence suits by requiring that the United States be substituted as the party 
defendant upon certification by the Attorney General, or his designee, that the employee was acting 
within the scope of his employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2004). Once the United States is 
substituted as the party defendant, the case is converted into an FTCA action and must comply with 
the administrative exhaustion and other requirements of FTCA suits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). 
However, the Westfall Act specifically provides that this protection “does not extend . . . to a civil 
action against an employee of the [federal] Government . . . brought for a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.” § 2679(b)(2). Courts have consistently held that the Westfall Act 
does not “supplant” Bivens, and many see it as implicitly ratifying it. See Apampa v. Layng, 157 
F.3d 1103, 1104 (7th Cir. 1998); Haas v. Schalow, No. 98-1777, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32654, at 
*5–6 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (“Although the United States may be substituted for a federal 
employee accused of committing a tort within the scope of his employment under the Westfall Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), the Act does not apply to an action against an employee which is brought for a 
violation of the Constitution.”). 
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action typically must be based on state law,48 and violations of the 
federal constitution are uniquely federal in character.49 In other words, 
while the vast majority of suits for alleged government misconduct are 
brought under the FTCA, suits for constitutional violations must be 
brought against the officer individually.  
2. Constitutional torts  
The term “constitutional tort” refers to suits brought against 
government agents for violating the Constitution, and these suits are 
based, in part, on the theory that someone acting in the name of the 
government, even unconstitutionally, “possesses a far greater capacity 
for harm than an individual . . . exercising no authority other than his 
own.”50 Because this Comment seeks to explore potential theories of 
recovery for victims of torts committed outside the territory of the United 
States, it is important to first understand the operation of these theories 
within the United States. 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment has incorporated most of the 
Bill of Rights against the states and their officials, both federal and state 
officials are obligated to respect federal constitutional commands.51 But 
while the substantive restraints on both state and federal government 
actors are largely the same, the methods of enforcing rights against those 
actors are quite different. Constitutional tort suits against state actors are 
typically brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a broad 
remedy for constitutional violations.52 However, § 1983 does not apply 
to federal officers.53 The Supreme Court, though, in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, created a 
similar remedy against federal agents.54 Because states generally do not 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). 
 49. See, e.g., 35A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 5, at n.5 (2004). 
 50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 
(1971). 
 51. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2011 (2004) (“[T]he incorporation 
doctrine . . . holds that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates and applies against the States the 
Bill of Rights . . . .”).
 52. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 53. Russell v. United States Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 54. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). There is some congressional and scholarly support for creating a 
statutory right of action against federal officers or agents. See, e.g., Michael B. Hedrick, Note, New 
Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Efforts To Replace the Bivens Action with a Statutory Waiver of 
the Sovereign Immunity of the United States for Constitutional Tort Suits, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1055 (2003). Mr. Hedrick’s article collects and analyzes a number of valuable sources. I disagree 
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act internationally, and because most international operations are 
conducted under federal law—including under the so-called dormant 
foreign relations power reserved to the Executive Branch55—this Subpart 
will focus on the Bivens doctrine. It will, however, first briefly discuss 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for contrastive purposes. 
 
a. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is perhaps the most important of 
the civil rights statutes.56 It provides the following: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .57
In short, § 1983 provides a remedy against state officers for 
violations of federal law.58 In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court 
extended § 1983 liability to those actions that would have also been 
unlawful under state law, holding that the fact that state law also makes 
the conduct illegal “is no barrier to . . . suit in the federal court.”59 By 
holding that § 1983 is available even where there is a remedy under state 
with his conclusion that the United States, rather than the individual officers, should be liable for 
constitutional torts. Id. at 1065–67. As discussed infra regarding Malesko, one of the purposes of the 
Bivens remedy is the deterrent effect of personal liability. Infra Part II.B.1. Substituting the United 
States for such violations would likely resolve a number of problems with immunity, see infra notes 
98–103 and accompanying text, but making individual officers—the targets of the Bivens remedy—
immune to suits for their own intentional deprivations of constitutional rights, seems shortsighted. It 
is better to deter violations than merely designate who shall pay. There is also the apparent 
Congressional ratification (or at least acquiescence) of Bivens in the Westfall Act. See supra note 47. 
 55. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 56. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985) (Section 1983 is the “most important, and 
ubiquitous, civil rights statute.”). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 58. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), for the proposition that there can be § 1983 
liability for violations of the Social Security Act. By so holding, the Court extended § 1983 liability 
to even federal laws not enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Now § 1983 is available for 
nearly all federal laws that provide enforceable individual rights of action, see Gonzaga Univ. v. 
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), 
unless Congress has intended to provide an alternative remedy, see Middlesex County Sewerage 
Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 59. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). While various parts of Monroe have been called into question 
in later decisions, its holding that state officers can be sued under § 1983 for any federal 
constitutional violation is still good law. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42 at 475–78. 
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law, the Supreme Court made § 1983 an attractive option where state law 
may impose procedural obstacles, such as a notice or exhaustion 
requirement, to suits against government agents.  
In certain circumstances, § 1983 also provides a remedy against 
private persons who act under color of state law.60 A private individual 
can be liable under § 1983 if “he is a willful participant in joint activity 
with the State or its agents”61 or if he exercises a function typically 
reserved to the states, such as providing private police or security 
services.62 For example, in Johnson v. Larabida Children’s Hospital, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a  
private party will be deemed to have acted under “color of state law” 
when the state either (1) “effectively directs or controls the actions of 
the private party such that the state can be held responsible for the 
private party’s decision”; or (2) “delegates a public function to a private 
entity.”63
Section 1983 is important in civil rights litigation both because it is 
broad and because it is statutory. As discussed below, because it is judge-
made, not only is Bivens subject to frequent criticism, it is also subject to 
frequent judicial tinkering not applied to § 1983.64
 
b. Bivens. Section 1983 does not address violations of federal law by 
federal officers or others acting under color of federal law.65 In part to 
cure the inequity of providing relief for victims of constitutional 
violations by state but not federal officers, the Supreme Court, in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, created a 
cause of action against federal agents in their individual capacity for such 
violations.66
 60. See Johnson v. Larabida Children’s Hosp., 372 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2004) (“While 
generally employed against government officers, the language of § 1983 authorizes its use against 
private individuals who exercise government power; that is, those individuals who act ‘under color 
of state law.’”). 
 61. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 372 F.3d at 896 (quoting Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 
623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 64.  See infra notes 76–97 and accompanying text. 
 65. Russell v. United States Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Federal officers acting under federal 
authority are immune from suit under section 1983.”). 
 66. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Quoting Marbury v. Madison for the proposition that “[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
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In Bivens, federal drug officers conducted an unconstitutional search 
and seizure.67 Despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment does not 
specifically provide an individual right of action to persons subjected to 
unauthorized searches,68 the Court has concluded that “a violation of the 
[Fourth] Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”69 Because “the Fourth 
Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power,” 
and because subsequent remedies such as exclusion of evidence would 
not put the injured party in the position he would have been in but for the 
intrusion, the remedy for that constitutional violation “is damages or 
nothing.”70 Furthermore, while exclusion of evidence may annoy federal 
law enforcement officers, the Court concluded that neither exclusion nor 
state tort actions for trespass would provide a sufficient deterrent to 
prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment.71 Therefore, the Court held 
that someone injured by unconstitutional conduct by a federal agent 
could assert a claim for damages directly under the Fourth Amendment.72
In addition to Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court has 
recognized a Bivens remedy for violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.73 The Court has also “accepted the general existence 
of [Bivens] causes of action for violations of the First Amendment,”74 
and lower federal courts have allowed Bivens suits for violations of the 
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.75
the laws, whenever he receives an injury,” the Court further concluded that providing no remedy at 
all was unacceptable. Id. at 397 (quoting 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).  
 67. Id. at 397. Not only were the search and arrest conducted without a warrant, the agents 
allegedly used unnecessary force. Id. at 389. 
 68. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
 69. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). 
 70. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392; id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 394–95; see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001). 
 72. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–97. The Bivens Court also justified a damages remedy on the 
traditional availability of damages for violations of privacy interests. Id.  
 73. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228 (1979)). 
 74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 593 n.30 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)); 
see also Rebecca L. Brogan, Research, Prisoners’ Rights, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 873, 
879–85 (2004) (collecting sources). 
 75. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 593 nn.31–36 (collecting sources). Lower court 
decisions have been more explicit in accepting Bivens suits for First Amendment and for other types 
of constitutional torts. See generally id. at 587–610 for a thorough overview of the Bivens doctrine. 
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Because the Bivens remedy is implied by the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has “responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens 
remedies be extended into new contexts”76 and has routinely limited the 
scope of the remedy. For example, in FDIC v. Meyer, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that Bivens relief is unavailable against a federal 
agency, even if the employees of that agency could potentially have been 
liable.77 Furthermore, Bivens relief is unavailable if “Congress has 
provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declare[s] to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and [which is] 
viewed as equally effective.”78 Finally, the creation of a cause of action 
under Bivens is inappropriate where there are “special factors counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”79
The Bivens remedy is also problematic because the Supreme Court 
has justified it on two different theories. As will become clearer after 
discussing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,80 the Supreme Court has 
justified this creation of a constitutional/common-law cause of action on 
the theory that to do so is necessary to vindicate the deprivation of a 
constitutional right,81 and to deter government officers from acting 
unconstitutionally.82 In most cases, these different rationales overlap, but 
in the discussion of Abu Ghraib, the deterrence rationale applies but the 
vindication rationale does not. The Supreme Court’s most recent major 
decision on Bivens, Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko,83 is 
important for this Comment’s analysis of remedies for the Abu Ghraib 
victims because it forcefully articulates the deterrence rationale.84  
 
 76. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988). 
 77. 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). 
 78. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980). 
 79. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. There are some courts that have seen the Westfall Act as 
Congressional ratification of the Bivens doctrine. See supra note 47. 
 80. 494 U.S. 259 (1990); see infra Part IV. 
 81. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] traditional judicial 
remedy such as damages is appropriate to the vindication of the personal interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)); id. at 407–08 (“[A]ccording . . . compensatory relief does 
not turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct.”); see also, e.g., 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 243–44 (1979). 
 82. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of 
whether the States in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the 
identical act if engaged in by a private citizen.”).  
 83. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 84. Id. at 72. 
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  (1) Malesko: Bivens, private actors, and the deterrence rationale. 
The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Correctional Services 
Corporation v. Malesko limited the availability of a Bivens remedy in 
cases against private actors (government contractors) brought under a 
respondeat superior theory.85 In Malesko, a federal inmate was enrolled 
in a halfway house operated by Correctional Services Corporation 
(CSC), a private corporation under contract with the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons.86 During his imprisonment, the inmate was diagnosed with a 
heart condition and was permitted to use the elevator to reach his fifth-
floor room, despite a policy that required inmates “residing below the 
sixth floor to use the staircase rather than the elevator to travel from the 
first-floor lobby to their rooms.”87 Despite his exemption, a CSC 
employee required the inmate to take the stairs.88 While doing so, he 
suffered a heart attack, fell, and was injured.89
The inmate sued both the employee who had required him to use the 
stairs and CSC under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Relying on 
the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in FDIC v. Meyer,90 which held 
that Bivens relief is unavailable against federal agencies, the district court 
dismissed his complaint against CSC.91 Additionally, it dismissed the 
complaint against the employee as barred by the statute of limitations.92
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that 
Bivens does not support respondeat superior liability.93 “‘[T]he purpose 
of Bivens is to deter the officer,’” not his employer.94 The Court reasoned 
that “if a corporate defendant [such as CSC] is available for suit, 
claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual 
directly responsible for the alleged injury.”95 By characterizing the 
purpose of Bivens as a deterrence, the Court easily concluded that the 
threat of suit against either the government or a private employer is 
 85. Id. at 70–71. 
 86. Id. at 63–64. 
 87. Id. at 64. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 91. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 65. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 71. 
 94. Id. at 69 (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485). 
 95. Id. at 71 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) 
(plurality)). 
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“insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals,”96 and that 
“[w]ith respect to the alleged constitutional deprivation, [the plaintiff’s] 
only remedy lies against the individual.”97
  (2) Qualified immunity. Recognizing that Bivens is a potentially 
broad doctrine against individuals accused of violating the Constitution 
does not mean that federal officers are automatically liable for 
constitutional torts. Rather, they enjoy the broad protection of the 
qualified immunity doctrine.98 In Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court 
held that a government employee accused of violating the Constitution 
“may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if [his] 
actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”99 Because the 
“clearly established test is met [only] if ‘in the light of pre-existing law 
the unlawfulness [is] apparent,’” honest mistakes by government 
employees are protected.100 In fact, qualified immunity has been held to 
protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
the law.”101
 96. Id. at 68. 
 97. Id. at 72. The Supreme Court did note that CSC could potentially be subject to respondeat 
superior liability under regular tort theories. Id. at 72–73. Justice Scalia, concurring in Malesko, said 
he does not believe Bivens should be extended to any new contexts. “Bivens is a relic of the heady 
days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them 
to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.” Id. at 75 (Scalia, 
J., concurring). Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three other justices, strongly disagreed. He 
argued that “[t]he violation was committed by a federal agent[,] a private corporation employed by 
the Bureau of Prisons[,]” and he criticized the majority for allowing state tort law to act as a 
replacement for federal constitutional protections infringed by that agent. Id. at 76–80 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also CHEMERINKSY, supra note 42, at 610 n.122. Chemerinsky compiles several pre-
Malesko cases that came to conflicting results as to whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate against 
private actors. See id.  
 98. Government employees, but not civilians acting under government authority, enjoy 
qualified immunity. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 
158, 168–69 (1992)). In negligence suits, the Westfall Act effectively provides absolute immunity 
for federal agents because the United States is substituted as the party defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 
2679(b)(1) (2004); supra note 47. 
 99. 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 100. Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Hope v. 
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). 
 101. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). But see Hope, 536 U.S. at 730. Hope is an 
important decision because it is one of the few recent Supreme Court cases to strike down a qualified 
immunity defense. See id. at 746–47. The plaintiff in Hope brought suit under § 1983 after prison 
guards placed him in leg irons, removed his shirt, and handcuffed him to a hitching post for seven 
hours in the summer sun with little water and no bathroom breaks. Id. at 734–35. Justice Stevens 
held that even though the use of a hitching post had not been ruled unconstitutional, the conduct was 
2BOR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM 
371] Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts 
 387 
 
Moreover, “[q]ualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial 
or face the other burdens of litigation.’ The privilege is ‘an immunity 
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability’” and should be raised 
early in the proceedings.102 Therefore, qualified immunity is a powerful 
shield available to federal government defendants (but not civilian 
contractors)103 who are sued under Bivens. 
3. Relief only available to aliens—the Alien Tort Statute 
While it may seem odd that there would be a statute allowing suits 
by aliens but not by citizens, this is precisely what the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) does.104 The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”105 Judge Friendly described the ATS as a “legal Lohengrin; . . . 
no one seems to know whence it came.”106 After the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, holding that the ATS permitted 
citizens of Paraguay to sue another citizen of Paraguay for torture that 
occurred there,107 the ATS has been used by a number of courts as 
grounds for hearing a broad range of cases alleging human rights 
violations.108 The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
so egregious that the defendants had “fair warning” from similar cases that their conduct was 
inappropriate. Id. at 741. 
 102. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
526 (1985)). 
 103. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168–69). 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). This statute is also referred to by many courts and 
commentators as the Alien Tort Claims Act or ATCA. See, e.g., Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 
205, 208 (2d Cir. 2004). Because the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain refers to the statute 
as the Alien Tort Statute, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004), this Comment will do the same.  
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 106. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Lohengrin was a knight in 
Germanic Grail legends who appeared in a swan-drawn boat to save a damsel in distress. See, e.g., 
Lohengrin, Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/ 
article?tocId=9370476 (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
 107. 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 108.  See, e.g., Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, 370 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 
2004); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). Filartiga has been described as a watershed 
case. See, e.g., David P. Kunstle, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable 
Rights and Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 319, 320 
(1996). Justice Scalia in Sosa criticized the Second Circuit as “start[ing] the Judiciary down the 
path” to conflict with the Executive and Legislative Branches. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2775 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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carefully considered the ATS and its proper scope, and it will be 
discussed in detail in Part III, infra. 
The ATS also includes the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA),109 which was enacted in 1992 to amend the ATS in the wake of 
Filartiga and is largely seen as ratifying Filartiga’s result.110 In Sosa, 
the Supreme Court described the enactment of the TVPA as a specific 
extension of judicial application of the ATS to provide relief for torture 
committed abroad.111 The TVPA creates a private right of action for any 
individual or his estate subjected to either an extrajudicial killing or 
torture committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of 
any foreign nation.”112
While the ATS is not available to U.S. citizens, it nevertheless offers 
intriguing options to the victims of abuse at Abu Ghraib that may not be 
available under the more traditional FTCA suits against the federal 
government itself or constitutional tort suits (§ 1983 and Bivens) against 
government agents. Because the contours of a cause of action under the 
ATS will now depend on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that 
statute in Sosa, the next Part will detail both the factual and procedural 
history of the Sosa decision and its analysis of the ATS. 
III. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN—THE MOST RECENT SUPREME COURT 
DECISION ON DOMESTIC LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT 
As mentioned above, because American soldiers and contractors 
have been immunized against prosecution under Iraqi law,113 if the Abu 
Ghraib victims should choose to assert liability against their abusers, 
they must do so under U.S. law. The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain will play an important role in evaluating what 
theories of recovery should be available to them because Sosa involved a 
suit by an alien for conduct occurring in a foreign country. In Sosa, a 
Mexican doctor, who had been forcibly abducted from his office in 
 109. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2004)). 
 110. See, e.g., James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 Note, 199 A.L.R. FED. 389 (2004). 
 111. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765. 
 112. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a) (emphasis added). Because the TVPA, unlike the ATS, 
provides a cause of action for any individual, it provides a cause of action for U.S. citizens subjected 
to torture. The TVPA also includes an exhaustion requirement in favor of local tribunals and a ten-
year statute of limitations. Id. § 2(b)–(c). 
 113. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2; see also 
supra notes 13 & 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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Guadalajara and prosecuted for his alleged role in the torture-murder of a 
DEA agent, sued civilly after the criminal case against him was 
dismissed.114 Because the Supreme Court’s ruling on the doctor’s 
various theories will control future suits on those theories, this Part will 
discuss the Sosa decision and the Supreme Court’s holdings on the 
FTCA and ATS. It will also discuss the possibility of Bivens suits, which 
the doctor pleaded but did not press on appeal, and which the Supreme 
Court intimated would be available. 
A. The Factual and Procedural History of Alvarez-Machain’s Criminal 
Prosecution 
The decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was nearly twenty years in 
the making. In February 1985, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) officer, “was kidnapped outside the 
American consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico.”115 Approximately one 
month later, his “mutilated body was found about sixty miles outside of 
Guadalajara along with the body of his Mexican pilot.”116 A tape 
recording made by his kidnappers indicated that Agent Camarena was 
interrogated, tortured, and then murdered.117
Based on that recording, eye-witness testimony, and other evidence, 
the DEA concluded that Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain had kept Agent 
Camarena alive during the interrogation and participated in his torture.118 
After the DEA’s negotiations with Mexican government officials to have 
Alvarez-Machain extradited to the United States were unsuccessful, the 
DEA hired a number of Mexican bounty hunters, including Jose 
Francisco Sosa, to abduct Alvarez-Machain and bring him to the United 
 114. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746–47. 
 115. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601–02 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
 116. Id. at 602. 
 117. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746; United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768–69 
(9th Cir. 1995). Camarena’s brutal torture and murder prompted “Operation Leyenda,” the largest 
homicide investigation ever undertaken by the DEA. See DEA History Book 1985–1990, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/deamuseum/dea_history_book/1985_1990.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2005). It is also still at the center of a number of conspiracy theories. See, e.g., Who’s a Rat Message 
Board, http://www.websitetoolbox.com/tool/post/whosarat/ 
vpost?trail=30&id=12 (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
 118. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice 
Oversight (May 16, 2000) (statement of William E. Ledwith, Chief, Office of International 
Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration) (testifying that the tapes implicating the various 
defendants were seized by the Mexican military and turned over to the DEA), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/ct051600_01.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
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States.119 Pursuant to a plan apparently approved by the DEA,120 on 
April 2, 1990, five or six Mexican agents abducted Alvarez-Machain 
from his obstetrics office in Guadalajara at gunpoint.121 Alvarez-
Machain testified that he was taken to a house where he was subjected to 
various abuses and, after waiting for several hours, was flown to El Paso, 
Texas.122 In El Paso, DEA agents took custody of Alvarez-Machain and 
transported him to Los Angeles.123
Over the strenuous objections of the Mexican government, which 
considered the abduction a violation of the U.S./Mexico extradition 
treaty,124 Alvarez-Machain was brought before the District Court for the 
Central District of California. The district court agreed with Mexico and 
ordered Alvarez-Machain’s return to Mexico.125 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, citing its then-recent decision in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez that the forcible abduction of Mexican citizens violated the 
U.S./Mexico Extradition Treaty and that the United States was required 
by the treaty to repatriate the suspects.126
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,127 holding that “to infer 
from this [Extradition] Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of 
gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond 
established precedent and practice.”128 In broad language, the Court held 
that “the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the 
fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of 
a ‘forcible abduction.’”129 On remand, the district court granted Alvarez-
Machain’s motion for acquittal.130
 119. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602–03. Not only did the DEA pay for the abduction, it 
brought a number of the abductors and their families to the United States. Id. at 603–04. 
 120. Id. at 603. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2001). The federal 
grand jury that indicted Alvarez-Machain sat in Los Angeles. Id. at 1049. 
 124. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 604. 
 125. Id. at 614. 
 126. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991)). Verdugo-Urquidez involved another 
one of the alleged participants in the Camarena murder. 939 F.2d at 1343. 
 127. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). It is somewhat odd that the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alvarez-Machain rather than Verdugo-Urquidez because the 
Ninth Circuit’s Alvarez-Machain decision was based almost entirely on Verdugo-Urquidez. 
 128. Id. at 668–69. 
 129. Id. at 661 (quoting Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)). Justice Stevens, joined 
by Justices Blackmun and O’Connor, vigorously dissented. He concluded that the extradition treaty 
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B. Alvarez-Machain’s Civil Suit 
1. The district and circuit courts 
After the criminal proceedings against Alvarez-Machain were 
terminated, he returned to Mexico and initiated a civil suit against the 
United States under the FTCA for a number of alleged torts,131 against 
the DEA officers under Bivens for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment,132 and against the Mexican bounty hunters under Bivens 
and the ATS for abducting him in violation of the law of nations.133 The 
district court granted summary judgment for the DEA agents and bounty 
hunters on the Bivens claims, finding that because a federal grand jury 
had indicted Alvarez-Machain and because a federal judge had issued a 
warrant for his arrest, any seizure was reasonable and therefore not 
provided the sole method for obtaining jurisdiction over a citizen of a contracting nation. Id. at 673–
74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1351). 
 130. The Ninth Circuit concluded on remand that no norms of customary international law 
prohibited federal court jurisdiction and remanded to the district court for trial. See United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court granted Alvarez-Machain’s 
motion for a judgment of acquittal. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746. The acquittal was apparently based, at 
least in part, on the government’s failure to arraign Alvarez-Machain before a magistrate promptly 
after entry to the United States and failure to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence. See 
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the evidence was 
apparently strong enough for Judge Goodwin to conclude that Alvarez-Machain “was present at the 
house where Camarena was held.” Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1035, 1048 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
There is also some suggestion that the district court excluded evidence implicating Alvarez-
Machain, despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect noncitizens outside of the United States. 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990); see also infra 
notes 193–95 and accompanying text. 
 131. Alvarez-Machain, 107 F.3d at 699. 
 132. Id. Alvarez-Machain originally asserted a Bivens claim under the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Amendments but did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments did not apply to the facts of the case. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, No. CV 
93-4072 SVW (SHx), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1999). While it is 
not entirely clear why the court made its Eighth Amendment finding, it was likely based on the 
testimony of a Dr. Meza (also referred to as Mesa), who examined Alvarez-Machain on his entry 
into the United States and concluded that there was “no sign of mistreatment or abuse” and that, at 
the time, Alvarez-Machain did not complain of any mistreatment by his kidnappers. Caro-Quintero, 
745 F. Supp. at 604. Therefore, the only Bivens claim remaining by the time of summary judgment 
(and subsequently presented to the Ninth Circuit) was for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 
 133. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747. Alvarez-Machain asserted claims under both the ATS and 
TVPA, but for reasons not entirely clear, he did not pursue the TVPA claims. See Alvarez-Machain 
v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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violative of the Fourth Amendment.134 It granted summary judgment to 
the United States on a number of the FTCA claims,135 but finding that 
the law enforcement exception applied, it refused to grant summary 
judgment on the counts alleging intentional torts by federal officers.136 
The court granted summary judgment in favor of Alvarez-Machain 
against the Mexican citizens on those claims brought under the ATS137 
and even awarded $25,000 on the abduction claim.138
On appeal, both a panel and the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
availability of the ATS as a remedy against Sosa and the other individual 
defendants on the abduction and arbitrary detention claims.139 
Specifically, the en banc majority held that the ATS “not only provides 
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of 
action for an alleged violation” of a “‘specific, universal, and 
obligatory’” norm of international law.140 Based on various international 
documents, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the norms against abduction 
and arbitrary detention were sufficiently specific, universal, and 
obligatory to support liability under the ATS.141
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the law enforcement exception ruling and 
reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States on 
the other FTCA claims.142 It concluded that the foreign country 
exception—which provides that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign 
country”143—did not bar Alvarez-Machain’s suit because of the 
 134. Alvarez-Machain, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *19–20. 
 135. Including those claims for kidnapping, cruel and degrading treatment, and negligent 
hiring. Id. at *27–*28, *30–*34. 
 136. Id. at *39–*40. As discussed supra at note 46 and accompanying text, the intentional tort 
exception allows the assertion of liability against the United States for conduct taken by law 
enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2004). 
 137. Alvarez-Machain, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *65, *76. 
 138. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747. The district court also expressed its willingness to grant 
summary judgment for Alvarez-Machain on the arbitrary detention claim. See Alvarez-Machain, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *64, *72. 
 139. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001) (panel); Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 140. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 141. Id. at 621 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702, cmt. h; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. art. 9(1) (Dec. 16, 1966) (ratified 
June 8, 1992) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”)). 
 142. Id. at 639–40. 
 143. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2004). 
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“headquarters doctrine.”144 The headquarters doctrine allowed a foreign 
plaintiff to assert FTCA liability against the United States for conduct or 
injuries occurring in a foreign country if government officers acting 
within the United States directed the conduct that led to that injury.145 It 
was based on the premise that the act of arranging or directing tortious 
conduct should create liability regardless of where the harm was 
realized.146 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions on the ATS and FTCA, but 
particularly to address its holding on the headquarters doctrine.147
2. The Supreme Court 
 a. The FTCA. All nine U.S. Supreme Court justices agreed to reverse 
the Ninth Circuit on the FTCA foreign country exception. Justice 
Souter’s opinion for the Court specifically rejected the headquarters 
doctrine: “We . . . hold that the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars 
all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of 
where the tortious act or omission occurred.”148 Because the FTCA 
incorporates the substantive law of the state where the act or omission 
occurs, and because of the prevalence of the lex loci delicti rule at the 
time the FTCA was enacted,149 the Court concluded that the foreign 
country exception150 was designed to avoid the application of foreign 
law against the United States in its sovereign capacity based solely on 
where an injury was felt.151
 144. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 638–39. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746. 
 148. Id. at 2754. 
 149. Id. at 2750–51. The Court explained lex loci delicti by reference to the RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934), which determines liability based on “the law of the 
place of wrong.” Thus, Justice Souter concluded, “[f]or a plaintiff injured in a foreign country . . . 
the presumptive choice in American courts under the traditional rule would have been to apply 
foreign law to determine the tortfeasor’s liability.” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751. 
 150. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). 
 151. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751. “The amended version, which was enacted into law and 
constitutes the current text of the foreign country exception . . . codified Congress’s ‘unwilling[ness] 
to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.’” Id. at 2752 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949)). Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for herself and Justice Breyer, would have applied a “last significant act or omission” rule 
rather than lex loci delicti, which would have made Mexico, not California, the source of relevant 
tort law. Id. at 2781–82 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In either event, by holding that the law of the 
place of injury applies, this choice of law analysis effectively precludes the Abu Ghraib detainees 
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 b. The ATS. The Supreme Court limited the availability of a cause of 
action under the ATS more narrowly than the Ninth Circuit had. The 
Court unanimously held that while the ATS is technically only 
jurisdictional, “at the time of enactment, the jurisdiction enabled federal 
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of 
nations and recognized at common law.”152 It further found that this 
limited category contained at least three torts mentioned by Blackstone: 
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, 
and piracy.”153
The Court split, though, over whether additional, more-recent 
principles of international law could be incorporated into the “law of 
nations” actionable under the ATS. A six justice majority concluded that 
“no development in the two centuries from the enactment of [the ATS] to 
the birth of the modern line of cases . . . has categorically precluded 
federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an 
element of common law.”154 While the majority was hesitant to extend 
federal common law,155 especially in situations involving international 
law (which is primarily the province of the executive),156 it did not rule 
out new causes of action under the ATS. As grounds for continuing to 
recognize the possibility of new causes of action under the ATS, the 
majority relied on the fact that “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that 
the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”157
from asserting common law tort theories against their abusers, who are immune to Iraqi law. See 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. For this reason, this 
Comment will not discuss common law tort theories against the abusers. 
 152. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754. 
 153. Id. at 2756 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68). Blackstone also 
included the slave trade among those torts that violated international law. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *68.  
 154. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761. Those concurring with Justice Souter’s opinion were Justices 
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 2764. 
 155. Id. at 2762. The Court specifically cited Malesko for the proposition that the “decision to 
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of 
cases.” Id. at 2762–63; see also supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 156. Id. at 2763. 
 157. Id. at 2764 (citing Sabbatino v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 
630, 641 (1981) (holding that “‘international disputes implicating 
 . . . our relations with foreign nations’ are one of the ‘narrow areas’ in which ‘federal common law’ 
continues to exist”)). Therefore, the majority was unwilling to conclude that the ATS is limited to 
just Blackstone’s three torts.  
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As to the question of how courts are to determine when a violation of 
international law can be remedied under the ATS, the majority generally 
accepted the “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm of international 
law rule employed by the Ninth Circuit.158 Although the majority held 
that an action must be clearly defined as violating customary 
international law to justify allowing a cause of action under the ATS, it 
also held that other factors should be considered.159 Among the other 
factors mentioned were treaties, statements by the political branches, 
“the customs and usages of civilized nations,” and the work of 
scholars.160
Under this standard, the majority found that any prohibition on 
arbitrary detentions was not sufficiently clearly defined so as to create a 
right to sue under the ATS.161 Justice Souter further posited that finding 
arbitrary detention actionable under the ATS would 
support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the 
world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took 
place, and would create a cause of action for any seizure of an alien in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, supplanting the actions under . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents . . . 
that now provide damages remedies for such violations.162
This is important dicta.163 While it forcefully closes the door to 
recovery by Alvarez-Machain against Sosa and the other defendants 
under the ATS,164 by referring to Bivens in the same paragraph as a 
 158. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (2003) (quoting In re Estate of 
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 159. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67. 
 160. Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). 
 161. Id. at 2769 (“[A] single illegal detention of less than a day . . . violates no norm of 
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.”). 
 162. Id. at 2768–69 (emphasis added). 
 163. It is dicta because Alvarez-Machain had abandoned the Bivens claim by the time his case 
reached the Supreme Court. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610 n.2 (“The constitutional claims under 
Bivens . . . are no longer at issue.”).  
 164. The Court unanimously agreed that Alvarez-Machain could not recover under the ATS. 
See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746 (“We hold that [Alvarez-Machain] is not entitled to a remedy under 
either the FTCA or the ATS.”). Justice Souter and the majority concluded that violations of the law 
of nations other than arbitrary detention could possibly support liability under the ATS, id. at 2764, 
and Justice Scalia would not allow any new liability under the ATS, id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). While it is still unclear whether Alvarez-Machain actually participated in Agent 
Camarena’s death, see supra note 130, if he is guilty, he has at least been barred from recovering 
civil damages. Cf. Beck v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 241 P.2d 544, 545 (Cal. 1952) (“[I]t would be 
unconscionable to allow [someone] to profit from his own wrong.”). But if he is actually innocent, as 
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discussion of extraterritorial searches, it juxtaposes extraterritorial 
conduct and constitutional liability and suggests that Bivens may be 
applicable to violations of the Fourth Amendment outside the United 
States.165 Because the ATS is available only to aliens, it would be 
illogical to suggest that § 1983 and Bivens could be supplanted by a 
cause of action under the ATS if aliens could not use § 1983 or Bivens to 
seek a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. And by 
suggesting that allowing a cause of action under the ATS for arbitrary 
detention committed outside the United States would supplant Bivens, 
the majority indicates that Bivens can be extended to extraterritorial 
conduct. In other words, if aliens could not sue for extraterritorial 
constitutional violations, there would have been no need to suggest that 
the ATS could supplant § 1983 and Bivens, and the majority’s statement 
that § 1983 and Bivens “now provide damages remedies for such 
violations”166 would make no sense. Thus, the clear implication of this 
statement is that aliens injured by extraterritorial unconstitutional 
conduct can, in certain situations, seek a remedy on a constitutional tort 
theory. 
Justice Breyer, who had joined Justice Souter’s opinion,167 
concurred specially to state that he would permit courts to consider 
violations of international law under the ATS only if they fell within the 
limited set of torts that every nation would subject to universal criminal 
jurisdiction.168 As examples of this narrow subset, Justice Breyer listed 
“torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”169 
Because arbitrary detention is not criminally punishable in a majority of 
countries, Justice Breyer concluded that Alvarez-Machain’s ATS claim 
should fail.170
suggested by the dismissal of the indictment, then the Supreme Court’s decisions holding that it is 
not only permissible to abduct someone in violation of a valid extradition treaty, United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992) (discussing the criminal case against Alvarez-Machain), 
but that the victim of such an abduction cannot sue his abductors, Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769, are 
disturbing. To repeat Justice Stevens’ dissent in Alvarez-Machain’s criminal case, “most courts 
throughout the civilized world—will be deeply disturbed by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court 
announces today. For every nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected, 
directly or indirectly, by a decision of this character.” Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687–88 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 165. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990); infra Part IV. 
 166. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 167. See id. at 2745 (indicating Justice Breyer in the majority). 
 168. Id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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The remaining three justices (Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas) agreed 
the ATS provided a cause of action for Blackstone’s three torts at the 
time of its enactment.171 However, Justice Scalia argued that courts 
should not be able to consider any other torts under the ATS, on the 
conclusion that whatever power federal courts had had to craft common 
law causes of action at the time the ATS was enacted had “been 
repudiated by Erie” and its progeny.172  
3. Suits for extraterritorial torts after Sosa  
 Because Sosa directly ruled on a suit by an alien asserting liability 
against the United States under the FTCA and its agents under the ATS, 
it is controlling precedent for any suit that the Abu Ghraib detainees may 
bring under either theory. The Court’s holding in Sosa that the foreign 
 171. Id. at 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 172. Id. at 2773. Justice Scalia’s concurrence compares the ATS with Bivens, both of which 
involve judicially created causes of action. While he has criticized Bivens as being “a relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action[,] decreeing 
them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition,” Corr. Servs. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring), because Bivens seeks “to enforce a 
command of our own law[,] the United States Constitution,” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2772 (Scalia, J., 
concurring), he is willing to recognize Bivens’s continued validity in a narrow subset of cases, 
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring). He is not willing to do the same for the ATS. See 
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
The majority disagreed with Justice Scalia’s Erie conclusion.  
[The ATS] was enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise 
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations; 
and we know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject 
to any comparable congressional assumption. Further, our holding today is consistent 
with the division of responsibilities between federal and state courts after Erie, as a more 
expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [federal question jurisdiction] 
might not be.  
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 n.19. 
On the one hand, the majority’s decision simply ratifies the view that there was nothing 
magical about Blackstone’s torts, other than international consensus condemning them. See id. at 
2755–56; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71 (“[P]iracy  
. . . is an offense against the universal law of society . . . .”). Accordingly, the majority’s conclusion 
that clearly defined violations of the law of nations should be actionable under the ATS is 
unremarkable. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. On the other hand, Justice Scalia is right that Erie was “an 
avulsive change, wrought by ‘conceptual development in understanding common law . . . [and 
accompanied by an] equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it.’” Id. 
at 2773 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the majority, id. at 2762). Because I am primarily concerned 
with the practical question of what causes of action would be available should the Abu Ghraib 
victims choose to sue their abusers in U.S. courts, I am more interested in Justice Souter’s majority 
opinion. A full analysis of the Erie and federal common law questions raised by Justice Scalia is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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country exception categorically bars suits against the United States for 
injuries received in a foreign country will preclude the Abu Ghraib 
detainees from asserting liability against the United States in its 
sovereign capacity. However, the majority’s holding—that a violation of 
a sufficiently clearly defined norm of customary international law will 
allow the creation of a cause of action under the ATS—should be 
extended to torture, based on both domestic and international agreement 
that torture violates customary international law.173 And combined with 
Justice Breyer’s narrower position that modern international law 
allowing universal criminal jurisdiction over “torture, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes”174 would permit a cause of action 
under the ATS for such conduct, there is a good argument that what 
happened at Abu Ghraib—if determined to be torture—should be 
covered by the ATS.175
The potential availability of Bivens after Sosa is a harder question. 
As discussed above, the statement in Justice Souter’s majority opinion 
juxtaposing extraterritorial conduct and constitutional liability implies 
that Bivens is available for certain violations of the Constitution 
wherever they occur.176 But this conclusion needs to be analyzed in light 
of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, another Supreme Court case 
discussing (and limiting) the extraterritorial application of the United 
States Constitution.177
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ AND THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 
Because any suits by the Abu Ghraib detainees would need to plead 
U.S. law,178 and because constitutional tort theories are one of the 
principal methods for holding government agents responsible for 
 173. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 174. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2783 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 404 & cmt. a (1986)).
 175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004); see infra notes 253, 258–59. I suspect that some of the 
conduct at Abu Ghraib would satisfy the legal definition of torture, while other conduct, though 
reprehensible, would not. See Complaint, Ali v. Rumsfeld, supra note 9. 
 176. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768 (concluding that § 1983 and Bivens “now provide damages 
remedies” for extraterritorial seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 177. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 178. Otherwise, both the soldiers and civilian contractors would be shielded by the immunity 
provided by Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. 
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violations of the Constitution,179 whether a constitutional tort would lie 
for conduct occurring outside of the United States is an important 
consideration in evaluating the full range of options that would be 
available to the Abu Ghraib detainees. 
This consideration raises a number of questions, including whether it 
is appropriate to apply domestic law, and particularly constitutional law, 
extraterritorially. There is a general presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of domestic law, but that presumption is 
subject to a number of qualifications.180 For purposes of analyzing any 
potential liability arising from the abuse at Abu Ghraib, the most 
important of these qualifications is the principle that the Constitution can 
bind the conduct of U.S. officers wherever they act. However, this 
principle is also subject to qualification and dispute. 
Therefore, Subpart A will discuss United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, which held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect aliens 
from searches conducted in foreign countries.181 Subpart B will discuss 
the differences between the Fourth and Eighth Amendments and will 
argue that these differences support the proposition that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause limits the conduct of U.S. officers wherever 
they act. Therefore, violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause should support a cause of action under Bivens wherever they are 
committed. 
A. The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law—Verdugo-Urquidez and 
the Constitution  
“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”182 In United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court held that “[n]either the 
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in 
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.”183 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez is an important starting point in 
the constitutional analysis of potential remedies under U.S. law for the 
 179. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 180. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 181. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 182. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 285). 
 183. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
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Abu Ghraib victims because it considers the relationship between the 
commands of the Constitution and the conduct of federal officers 
extraterritorially. 
In Verdugo-Urquidez the Supreme Court considered whether “the 
Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States 
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a 
foreign country.”184 The factual scenario is fairly straightforward: DEA 
agents believed that Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican citizen, 
was a drug smuggler and had participated in Agent Camarena’s 
murder.185 Mexican police arrested Verdugo-Urquidez and transported 
him to California, where he was turned over to the U.S. Marshals.186 
DEA agents arranged a search of Verdugo-Urquidez’s property in 
Mexico, obtained permission from the Director General of the Mexican 
Federal Judicial Police, and then conducted the searches.187
The district court suppressed the evidence seized in the searches.188 
The court held that because the searches and seizures had not been 
authorized by a warrant, they were unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.189 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court 
reversed,190 holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
nonresident aliens from unreasonable searches or seizures in foreign 
countries, and that there was therefore no need to rely on the 
reasonableness analysis employed by the district court.191
The Supreme Court based its conclusion on the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, which protects “[t]he right of the people.”192 “‘[T]he 
people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community.”193 Because Verdugo-Urquidez was not a resident of 
 184. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261. 
 185. Id. at 262; see also supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 186. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 263. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. One Ninth Circuit judge dissented, concluding that the Curtiss-Wright decision barred 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. Id. at 264 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). 
 191. Id. at 274–75 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 192. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 193. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
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the United States, the Court concluded that he was not included within 
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment.194
The Court distinguished cases addressing or protecting the 
constitutional rights of aliens by concluding that those cases “establish 
only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with the country.”195 Based on this principle, the Verdugo-
Urquidez majority concluded that applying the Fourth Amendment 
extraterritorially would allow “aliens with no attachment to this country . 
. . [to] bring [Bivens] actions for damages to remedy claimed violations 
of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries.”196 Even though it 
recognized that Bivens relief can be limited when there are “special 
factors counseling hesitation,”197 the possibility of suits by aliens “with 
no attachment to this country” seemed particularly troubling to the 
Court.198
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, argued that “the Government 
may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in 
question are foreign or domestic.”199 He agreed that the Fourth 
 194. Id. at 274–75. 
 195. Id. at 271; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established 
that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to 
aliens outside of our geographic borders.”); Khalid v. Bush, Civil Case No. 1:04-1142 (RJL), Civil 
Case No. 1:04-1166 (RJL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *24 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005) (“In the final 
analysis, the lynchpin for extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry to aliens was and 
remains ‘the alien’s presence within [the United States’] territorial jurisdiction.’” (citing Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950))). Zadvydas, Khalid and Eisentrager all involved requests to 
recognize a right to habeas corpus for aliens held by the United States. They could be distinguished 
on this ground from the discussion of Abu Ghraib, in which the victims would be seeking civil 
damages as opposed to habeas relief. 
 196. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. While this statement may pose problems for victims 
of abuses by United States officials, the Abu Ghraib detainees could argue that they have at least a 
nominal “attachment to this country” because they are detained by American military police. See 
infra note 286 and accompanying text. 
 197. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 16, 18 (1980). 
 198. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. Notably, the Court did not preclude the application 
of Bivens to cases brought by aliens. See id. In fact, it specifically left the question open. See id. At 
the very least, the Abu Ghraib detainees have some attachment to this country in that they were held 
under U.S. authority and abused by U.S. citizens exercising authority over them pursuant to U.S. 
policy. 
 199. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality 
opinion)). Contra id. at 268–69 (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (“[N]ot every constitutional 
provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power . . . 
[or] wherever the United States Government exercises its power.” (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 
U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 
(1904))). 
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Amendment had not been violated because a number of factors—
including “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue 
warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of 
reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate 
with foreign officials”—justified the failure to apply the strict protections 
of the Fourth Amendment.200 He even agreed that the Court could 
properly distinguish between citizens and aliens.201 But he was unwilling 
to consider the proposition that officials acting under the authority of the 
Constitution can act unconstitutionally. 
Given the history of our Nation’s concern over warrantless and 
unreasonable searches, . . . [t]he restrictions that the United States must 
observe . . . depend . . . on general principles of interpretation, not on 
an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a construction that 
some rights are mentioned as being those of “the people.”202
Thus, one of the principal differences between the majority and the 
concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez is their view of whether the 
Constitution protects only citizens (and those aliens that have become 
part of the national community), or whether it limits the power of 
government to act. Under the majority’s approach, the Constitution 
protects citizens, and even arguably unconstitutional conduct by 
government actors does not give rise to a constitutional remedy if a 
citizen’s rights are not violated.203 Under Justice Kennedy’s approach, 
the Constitution regulates the conduct of government actors wherever 
they operate.204 This debate also informs an analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment—the constitutional provision most likely to support a 
Bivens remedy for the Abu Ghraib detainees—because the Eighth 
Amendment is subject to both constructions. 
B. Two Views of the Eighth Amendment 
There are important differences between the Eighth Amendment and 
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Unlike the First, Second, and 
 200. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 201. Id. at 275–76. 
 202. Id. at 276 (emphasis added). 
 203. In Verdugo-Urquidez the constitutional remedy was the exclusion of evidence in a 
criminal prosecution. Id. at 264. Any discussion of Bivens was therefore dicta. 
 204. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Under this approach, Bivens relief ought to be 
available against U.S. officers for unconstitutional actions taken abroad. 
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Fourth Amendments, which protect “the people,”205 and unlike the First 
Amendment, which is addressed to Congress,206 the Eighth Amendment 
simply prohibits specified activities.207 The entire text of the Eighth 
Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”208
The first two prohibitions, the Excessive Bail and Excessive Fines 
Clauses, impose limitations on judicial processes similar to those 
imposed by the Fifth209 and Sixth210 Amendments. The Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, though, not only applies to the judicial 
process as a limitation on sentencing,211 but it also imposes limitations 
on how the government can treat prisoners.212  
If the Eighth Amendment regulates the treatment of prisoners within 
the United States (and it does213), it should similarly regulate the 
treatment of prisoners held under U.S. authority outside of the United 
States.214 In other words, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
 205. U.S. CONST. amends. I, II & IV. Thus, the Eighth Amendment, unlike other provisions of 
the Bill of Rights, does not have the hook on which the Supreme Court hung its Verdugo-Urquidez 
analysis. Moreover, the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez never addressed the Eighth Amendment. See 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259. 
 206. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
 207. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 208. Id. 
 209. U.S. CONST. amend. V (setting out the Grand Jury Indictment Clause, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the federal Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause). 
 210. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (setting out the Speedy Trial Clause, the Confrontation Clause, 
and the Right to Counsel Clause). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 537 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 212. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
461, 488 (1993) (“[T]he better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended 
to place . . . substantive limitations on punishments” rather than procedural limits on the imposition 
of sentences.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258–64 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(discussing the debate on the Eighth Amendment and concluding that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause was intended as a limitation on government—particularly legislative—authority 
to control the treatment of prisoners); Brogan, supra note 74, at 888–900; David Heffernan, 
Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under 
International Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 481, 487–518 (1996) (discussing the evolution of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 213. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002), discussed supra note 101. 
 214. Obviously this argument is based on a view that the Eighth Amendment both protects a 
U.S. citizen’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and substantively limits the 
government’s conduct in the treatment of prisoners. One Law Review editor suggested that the 
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights in particular, is concerned with protecting the rights of “We the 
People,” not of aliens with no connection to the United States. While I realize that this view finds 
support in the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, I submit that providing no constitutional 
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should limit the conduct of U.S. agents whenever the United States acts 
in a penal or custodial capacity. Or, to return to the language of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, because the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause does more than just protect an individual’s 
rights, “the Government [should be able to] act only as the Constitution 
authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.”215
Because the Constitution would provide these limits on government 
actors, this approach would not violate the Curtiss-Wright maxim that 
“[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have 
any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.”216 In 
other words, because the conduct of U.S. government actors is controlled 
by the Constitution, and because federal agents are either citizens or 
otherwise bound by the Constitution, extending a constitutional 
limitation on conduct by government agents to wherever they act would 
still be “in respect of our own citizens.”217
This argument returns us to the question of whether the purpose of 
Bivens is to vindicate the violation of a right or to deter the violation of a 
constitutional command. If the purpose of the Constitution is to protect 
protection against cruel or unusual punishment to noncitizens held under U.S. authority is not 
supported by history or practice. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) 
(holding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable for lack of criminal punishment but not for lack of 
citizenship), id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (observing that “there is no limitation as to the 
beneficiaries” protected by the Third, Seventh, or Eighth Amendments); A. Mark Weisburd, Due 
Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379 (1997); 
Kristi J. Spiering, Comment, Irrebuttable Exile Under the Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Amendments: A Perspective from the Eighth Amendment and International Human Rights Law, 58 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1397, 1409 nn.78–79 (1990). Professor Weisburd’s analysis is particularly relevant. 
He analyzed Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), which basically held that the Fifth 
Amendment did not protect aliens held by U.S. forces abroad. See supra note 195. According to 
Professor Weisburd, because the Court  
felt it necessary to address . . . the distinction between a claim that a particular individual 
is entitled to the Fifth Amendment's protection and a claim that an individual has been 
harmed by an action which the federal government had no authority to take[,] . . . the 
Johnson court made clear that even persons not entitled to the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment were entitled to demand that the United States government refrain from 
actions which harmed them and which the government was not competent to take.  
Weisburd, supra, at 391. 
 215. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Eric B. Fisher, 
Note, The Road Not Taken: The Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment 
Reconsidered, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705 (1996). 
 216. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
 217. Id. Conduct limitations based on citizenship are quite common. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
2340A (2004) (providing that a U.S. national can be criminally prosecuted for torture in the United 
States regardless of where the conduct occurs). 
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the rights of citizens,218 and if aliens “with no attachment to this 
country”219 have no constitutional rights, then Bivens should not provide 
them a remedy even when U.S. officers act in a way that would violate 
the rights of a citizen.220 But if the Constitution limits and controls the 
conduct of government actors, and if the purpose of Bivens is to deter 
constitutionally unauthorized conduct,221 then Bivens should provide a 
remedy for anyone injured by unconstitutional conduct, regardless of 
where it occurs. As discussed above, Supreme Court precedent supports 
both views of Bivens.222
A fuller analysis of whether the Constitution protects the rights of 
“We the People,” whether it limits the government, or whether it protects 
rights by limiting the government is beyond the scope of this 
Comment.223 For present purposes it must suffice to argue that the 
potential for these different views of the Constitution prevents any of 
them from being dismissed out of hand. And if constitutionally 
unauthorized conduct by a government actor injures someone under that 
actor’s control, basic principles of equality224 militate in favor of 
providing a similar remedy under the law, regardless of the citizenship of 
the person injured. 
V. PROVIDING A REMEDY TO THE VICTIMS OF  
ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB 
Whether violations of the Constitution create a Bivens cause of 
action regardless of the citizenship of the victim is, of course, only one of 
the questions presented in addressing potential civil liability arising out 
of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. This Part will discuss the 
various U.S. laws under which the victims could potentially sue, 
 218. As implied in the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 219. Id. at 274. 
 220. See id. at 273. 
 221. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
392 (1971); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69–70 (2001) (quoting FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994)). 
 222. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (discussing how Bivens deters unconstitutional conduct); 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (explaining that Bivens protects citizens); supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 223.  For a thorough analysis of the varying ways questions involving the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution have been addressed, see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 
100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); see also Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV. 1 
(2005); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International 
Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 444 (1990). 
 224. But probably not the Equal Protection Clause. 
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including the FCA, FTCA, ATS, and Bivens, and will apply each of them 
to the potential defendants and to the particular circumstances of the war 
in Iraq. 
The abuses at Abu Ghraib were first disclosed when Sergeant Joseph 
Darby passed a disc with the now infamous photographs of detainee 
abuse to his commanding officer.225 The military began an internal 
investigation, the results of which are detailed in the report compiled by 
Major General Antonio Taguba. The Taguba Report concludes that there 
is “incontrovertible evidence that . . . abuse did occur.”226 Among the 
instances of “intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel” 
reported by Taguba were instances of physical violence, forced sexual 
degradation and assault, and intimidation by military dogs.227 Taguba 
characterized the conduct as criminal and concluded that both military 
personnel and civilian contractors were guilty of engaging in the 
abuse.228 There were also reports of at least two deaths from the 
abuse.229
As discussed in the Introduction, many of the soldiers accused of 
participating in the abuse have pleaded guilty to various crimes, and 
Specialist Graner has been convicted and sentenced by a court martial.230 
However, because courts martial maintain the distinction between 
criminal and civil proceedings,231 American court martial proceedings 
against the soldiers will likely not provide a civil remedy to the victims 
of abuse.232 And what of the civilian contractors who worked with the 
 225. See Richard A. Serrano & Greg Miller, Army Investigators Heard Accounts from Inmates 
of Abu Ghraib and Intelligence Officers, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A1; supra note 3. 
 226. Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2–6.  
 227. Id. at 16–17. 
 228. Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2. The ACLU sued for the release of documents related 
to the abuse scandal under the Freedom of Information Act. See Press Release, ACLU, Government 
Documents on Torture Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2005), at 
http://www.aclu.org/International/International.cfm?ID=13962&c=36. All of the documents released 
pursuant to that suit are available in PDF form from http:// 
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). There is also a good review of the 
Abu Ghraib situation at Wikipedia, Abu Ghraib Torture and Prisoner Abuse, at http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_torture_and_prisoner_abuse (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). 
 229. See Hersh, supra note 1. Unfortunately, there is mounting evidence that more deaths are 
also attributable to misconduct by government actors. See Morgan, supra note 2; Jehl & Schmitt, 
supra note 2. 
 230. See supra notes 4–6. 
 231. 53A AM. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 366 (2004). 
 232. Except perhaps for restitution. See supra note 7. There would likely be a different result 
in other countries, which generally provide civil relief in a consolidated proceeding with the criminal 
prosecution. As Justice Breyer points out in his concurrence in Sosa, while there is international 
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soldiers?233 While they could probably be prosecuted criminally in the 
United States under either the War Crimes Act of 1996234 or the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),235 neither of these options 
would provide a civil remedy to the victims. 
The remainder of this section will discuss the potential methods of 
obtaining civil relief against each of the potential defendants. It 
concludes that the FCA is probably the most attractive option for the Abu 
Ghraib victims because the FCA provides recovery from the fiscally 
responsible United States without involving the foreign country 
exception to the FTCA. If the victims choose not to pursue remedies 
under the FCA, or if they choose to hold their abusers directly 
consensus regarding “torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,” “[t]hat consensus 
concerns criminal jurisdiction,” not civil jurisdiction. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 
2783 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Even if “the criminal courts of many nations combine civil and 
criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover 
damages, in the criminal proceeding itself,” the American system does not. Id. For example, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) could likely have asserted both criminal and civil authority over 
the U.S. soldiers, and perhaps even the contractors, who participated in the abuse. See Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute grants jurisdiction over those accused of “crimes against humanity,” including 
torture, rape, and other sexual abuse. Additionally, article 8 grants jurisdiction over war crimes, 
including torture. Article 77 allows for the imposition of prison sentences, and a fine or forfeiture.  
Although the United States had signed the treaty on December 31, 2000, it withdrew from the 
ICC on May 6, 2002. See Press Statement, International Criminal Court: Letter to U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/ 
r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. Therefore, the ICC is not really an issue. Nevertheless, even if the United 
States had not withdrawn from the treaty, if the soldiers involved in the abuse were subject to court 
martial proceedings, they could not then be prosecuted at the ICC. See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 at art. 20(3) (providing that the ICC does 
not have jurisdiction to hear cases that have already been tried under domestic law). 
 233. See Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6 (reporting that Specialist Graner testified that “his 
orders came from civilian contractors as well as military intelligence”); Joanne Mariner, Private 
Contractors Who Torture, FINDLAW’S WRIT (May 10, 2004), at http://writ.find 
law.com/mariner/20040510.html; Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2. 
 234. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2004). The War Crimes Act allows prosecution of, and punishment 
for, “grave breaches of the Geneva Convention,” which prohibits torture, inhuman treatment, 
“outrages upon personal dignity,” and “humiliating and degrading treatment.” Geneva Convention, 
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516. There have been indictments filed against civilian contractors 
for violations of the War Crimes Act in Afghanistan. See Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra 
note 11. Even though there have not yet been indictments for civilian participation in the abuses at 
Abu Ghraib, if Afghanistan is an indicator, there may be, and this would be a welcome development. 
Section 2340A of 18 U.S.C. also provides that any U.S. national or anyone found in the United 
States who commits torture outside of the United States can be criminally prosecuted. 
 235. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000). MEJA was enacted to “establish Federal 
jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United States by persons employed by or 
accompanying the Armed Forces.” Id. at prologue. 
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accountable for their injuries, they can potentially sue under either the 
ATS or Bivens. Because the Supreme Court in Sosa would allow a suit 
under the ATS for violations of clearly defined and widely accepted 
violations of international law, torture and other abuse like that at Abu 
Ghraib should fall within the ATS.236 Bivens is a harder question because 
the Supreme Court has justified Bivens as both vindicating the 
infringement of constitutional rights,237 and as deterring unconstitutional 
conduct by government agents.238 While the deterrent rationale applies, 
the vindication rationale does not. This Comment argues that the unique 
circumstances at issue in the Abu Ghraib scandal should allow a Bivens 
cause of action allowing the noncitizen victims to sue either the 
individual soldiers or the private contractors who participated in the 
abuse. 
A. Remedies Against the United States in Its Sovereign Capacity 
 Of the potential defendants in any action arising from the abuses at 
Abu Ghraib, the United States in its sovereign capacity is likely most 
able to pay compensation. Normally, any claim against the United States 
for a tort must be pleaded under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the 
Foreign Claims Act creates an administrative claims process for foreign 
plaintiffs that is not subject to FTCA procedures or limitations.  
 The FCA provides the most direct route to relief for foreign 
plaintiffs.239 Under the FCA, there is no need to travel to the United 
States or deal with American legal procedure. Plaintiffs can go to local 
claims commissions and potentially receive compensation from the U.S. 
Government up to the full $100,000 allowed by statute.240 These factors 
make the FCA an attractive option for the victims of Abu Ghraib. And 
even though the FCA provides that injuries arising from the combat 
activities of the military are not compensable,241 the definition of 
 236. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67. 
 237. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990) (implying that Bivens 
should not be available to noncitizens with no connection to the United States).  
 238. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 485 (1994)); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 239. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2004). 
 240. See Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis, supra note 26. 
 241. FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 73:193 (update June 2004) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a)). 
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noncombat activities242 is sufficiently broad that it should include the 
operation of a prison that holds common criminals alongside detainees 
suspected of “crimes against the coalition” and a “small number of 
suspected ‘high-value’ leaders of the insurgency.”243 However, there is 
evidence that many FCA claimants are denied any recovery at all or 
given only minimal compensation.244
The other potential option for an action against the United States is 
the FTCA. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain—that “the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims 
based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the 
tortious act or omission occurred”245—conclusively bars the assertion of 
liability against the United States in its sovereign capacity for torts 
committed extraterritorially.246 Therefore, the FCA is really the only 
option for recovering from the United States government. 
B. United States Soldiers in Their Individual Capacity 
Even though the United States is more able to pay compensation to 
the victims than other potential defendants, if the victims choose not to 
pursue claims under the FCA, their next option would be suing the 
individuals who abused them. Suing the soldiers who participated in the 
abuse directly and in their individual capacities provides a promising 
avenue for the Abu Ghraib victims. Not only can the victims raise 
colorable claims under both the ATS and Bivens, but because Islam 
requires reparations for any physical injury, requiring their abusers to 
take responsibility would likely offer the victims some measure of 
personal satisfaction.247
 242. Noncombat activities include any “activity, other than combat, war or armed conflict, that 
is particularly military in character and has little parallel in the civilian community.” 32 C.F.R. § 
842.41(c) (2004). 
 243. Hersch, supra note 1. 
 244. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 245. 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 (2004) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2004)). 
 246. Had the conduct occurred within the United States, the FTCA might have allowed for 
liability against the United States based on the amendment allowing liability for intentional torts 
committed by law enforcement personnel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2004). Because the reservists 
were acting in a prison guard role, they were more like law enforcement officers than other soldiers. 
Sosa’s language about the FTCA’s foreign country exception sweeps more broadly than this 
amendment though. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754. 
 247.  Personal satisfaction, closure, and related ideas are obviously culture-dependent 
concepts. I suggest that the victims may gain some sense of satisfaction by recovering compensation 
from their abusers only because of Iraq’s cultural preference for providing relief to the victims of 
both intentional and unintentional wrongs. See AMIN, supra note 8, at 189. 
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1. The ATS and TVPA 
Torture should be remediable under the ATS because the 
international consensus prohibiting it is clearly defined.248 In Sosa, the 
unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the ATS created a right of 
action for “the modest number of international law violations with a 
potential for personal liability” at common law,249 and Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion further concluded that “no development in the two 
centuries from the enactment of [the ATS] to the birth of the modern line 
of cases . . . has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing 
a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law.”250  
The majority’s standard for determining whether conduct would give 
rise to liability under the ATS turns on whether it violates clearly defined 
customary international and common law.251 Two of the primary 
considerations the Court would look to in analyzing this question are 
whether there are (1) treaties or (2) domestic legislative enactments 
addressing the purported international norm.252 Torture satisfies both 
considerations. 
The United States has ratified the Covenant Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;253 the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which provides 
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”;254 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which contains the same prohibition against torture.255 
 248. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67. Torture would also be actionable under Justice Breyer’s 
narrower view of the ATS as only allowing suits under those torts that are subjected to universal 
criminal jurisdiction. See id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 & cmt. a (1986)).
 249. Id. at 2761. Again, these violations included “violation of safe conducts, infringement of 
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 2756 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *68). 
 250. Id. at 2761. Those concurring with Justice Souter’s opinion were Justices Stevens, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 2764. 
 251. See id. at 2766–67. 
 252. Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
 253. Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (ratified by the Senate on Oct. 21, 1994). The Senate 
attached a Statement of Declaration, Reservation, and Understanding to its ratification, available at 
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/reservations/cat.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) 
[hereinafter Understanding on the Convention Against Torture]. 
 254. Dec. 16, 1996, arts. 7, 10, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the Senate on June 8, 1992). 
 255. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. art. 
5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 8 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy 
by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
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Not only do these treaties potentially permit suits for torture under the 
provision of the ATS allowing suit for a tort “committed in violation of . 
. . a treaty of the United States,”256 but the Sosa majority cited treaties as 
one of the most authoritative expressions of the law of nations.257
Moreover, in ratifying the Convention Against Torture, the Senate 
attached an Understanding indicating that Congress interprets torture as 
any act “intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering,” 
threatening to inflict severe physical pain or suffering, or “other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the 
personality.”258 This definition would be useful for courts in evaluating 
whether the abuse at Abu Ghraib amounted to legal torture.259
In addition to considering treaties, the Sosa majority allows 
consideration of domestic statutes as evidence of customary international 
law.260 The Torture Victim Protection Act, which was specifically 
enacted as part of the ATS, provides a clear statement that the United 
States considers itself bound to uphold the international consensus 
against torture.261 Congress specifically enacted the TVPA to “carry out 
the obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and 
other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human 
rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an 
individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”262  
Thus, the United States has both entered treaties prohibiting torture 
and enacted domestic legislation providing “a civil action for recovery of 
damages from an individual who engages in torture.”263 This should 
satisfy a court that the customary international law norm prohibiting 
constitution or by law.” Id. at art. 8. It is also worth mentioning that The Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, art. 15(J) (Mar. 8, 2004), prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment. 
 256. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). The Sosa opinion analyzed the law of nations provisions of the 
ATS, not the treaty provisions. See Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2755–56, 2761–63. 
 257. Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2755–56, 2761–63.  
 258. Understanding on the Convention Against Torture, supra note 253, at II(1)(a). 
 259. This determination would have to be made on an individualized basis as to each plaintiff.  
 260. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). 
 261. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 262. Id. § 1350 note, preamble (2004). The TVPA also defines torture in many of the same 
terms as the Understanding on the Convention Against Torture. Compare id. § 3, with 
Understanding on the Convention Against Torture, supra note 253. 
 263. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2. 
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torture is sufficiently clearly defined in the United States so as to justify 
creating a cause of action under the ATS.264
The Abu Ghraib detainees would need to argue that the ATS covers 
torture, rather than simply suing directly under the TVPA, because of 
some unfortunate wording in the TVPA. In providing a private right of 
action against a torturer, the TVPA provides that “[a]n individual who, 
under actual or apparent authority or color of law[] of any foreign 
nation,” subjects someone to torture shall be liable in a civil action in the 
United States.265 The “of any foreign nation” language could present a 
problem because U.S. soldiers operate under U.S. law.266 While U.S. 
military law prohibits torture, the statutory remedy for such a violation is 
imposed by court martial and not a private right of action for the 
victim.267 If a court were to apply the statute’s language strictly, it would 
likely conclude that U.S. soldiers cannot be liable under the TVPA. 
While this result is ironic, it could actually bolster potential 
arguments by the Abu Ghraib victims that they should be able to sue 
under the ATS. If Congress is willing to subject defendants with no 
connection to the United States to liability for torture (despite the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law),268 
subjecting American defendants to liability for torture should certainly 
be permissible. 
2. Bivens  
As discussed above, whether Bivens should be available to remedy 
extraterritorial torts is a more difficult question than whether the ATS 
should provide a cause of action for torture. There are two distinct 
concerns with the Bivens remedy that make this question difficult. First, 
there are two different ways of justifying the creation of a Bivens 
remedy, either as vindicating the deprivation of a constitutional right,269 
 264. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. Even Justice Breyer’s narrower view—that creating a 
private right of action under the ATS is justified only for those international law norms deemed so 
important that states would subject them to universal criminal jurisdiction—would allow a cause of 
action for torture. See id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 265. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2 (emphasis added). 
 266. 10 U.S.C. §§ 802, 818 (2004) (providing that members of the military are subject to 
federal military law). Not only are soldiers subject to the U.S. military command structure, but any 
violations of military law are tried by a court martial. Id. § 818; see also Buchwalter, supra note 110. 
 267. See 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2004). 
 268. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).  
 269. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990). 
2BOR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM 
371] Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts 
 413 
 
or as deterring unconstitutional conduct by U.S. government agents.270 
Second, courts avoid extending the scope of Bivens if there are “special 
factors counseling hesitation.”271 However, neither of these concerns 
should preclude the creation of a Bivens remedy for the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. 
 
 a. Vindication and deterrence. The Supreme Court has justified 
Bivens as both a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights,272 and 
as a deterrent of unlawful conduct by government actors.273 The 
Supreme Court has also explicitly extended Bivens to violations of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause (and since that clause regulates 
prisoner treatment, it is the most relevant constitutional provision to the 
events at Abu Ghraib).274 Because the Abu Ghraib detainees are neither 
American citizens nor within American territorial jurisdiction they 
probably do not have a constitutional right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment.275 But because the soldiers are U.S. government 
agents, the deterrence rationale of Bivens should apply against them.276
In this context, the tension between the different underlying 
rationales for Bivens is clear. If the vindication rationale has priority, the 
fact that the detainees are not U.S. citizens would be determinative, 
regardless of the soldiers’ culpability. And if the deterrence rationale has 
priority, victims without constitutional rights could recover against U.S. 
government agents under a constitutional tort theory. In other words, the 
 270. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 
510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994)); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). 
 271. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
 272. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (implying that Bivens should not be 
available to noncitizens with no connection to the United States). 
 273. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69. 
 274. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see also discussion supra notes 73, 
101 & 212. 
 275. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265; Khalid v. Bush, Civil Case No. 1:04-1142 
(RJL), Civil Case No. 1:04-1166 (RJL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *24 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005) 
(“In the final analysis, the lynchpin for extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry to 
aliens was and remains ‘the alien’s presence within [the United States’] territorial jurisdiction.’” 
(quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950))). Even if they do not enjoy a 
constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, they should enjoy this freedom as 
a human right. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 255. The deprivation of 
human rights, though, does not create Bivens liability. 
 276. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (“[T]he threat of suit against the United States [is] 
insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals.”); id. at 69 (“‘[T]he purpose of Bivens is 
to deter the officer.’” (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994))). 
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two rationales appear to be mutually exclusive in this situation. If the 
victims are allowed to recover under Bivens despite not being citizens, 
then the vindication rationale, and Justice Rehnquist’s discussion of the 
Constitution-as-social-contract in Verdugo-Urquidez,277 would be 
vitiated. And if soldiers are able to abuse people with impunity, simply 
because their victims are not U.S. citizens or aliens within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States,278 the deterrence rationale would be 
reduced to an inquiry about who the victim is, rather than about what the 
officer did and whether that action was constitutionally appropriate. 
Neither of these alternatives is completely satisfactory. Still, there 
are three reasons that Bivens relief should be available to the Abu Ghraib 
victims. First, Justice Souter’s opinion for the majority in Sosa presumes 
that Bivens is available to remedy extraterritorial constitutional torts.279 
In concluding that the ATS should not provide a cause of action for 
arbitrary detention, Justice Souter stated that allowing a claim under the 
ATS would “supplant[] the actions under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
Bivens . . . that now provide damages remedies” for unconstitutional 
seizures of aliens.280 This statement indicates that a majority of the Court 
believes that in certain circumstances Bivens is available to aliens injured 
abroad.281 Saying that Bivens should be unavailable to the Abu Ghraib 
victims simply because they are aliens would be inconsistent with the 
majority opinion in Sosa.282
 277. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 274 (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects “[t]he right of the people,” which “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be 
considered part of that community”).  
 278. See id. at 265; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 279.  See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 280.  Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text. 
 281. The Sosa majority’s statement is perhaps inconsistent with the dicta in Verdugo-Urquidez 
that expressed discomfort at the possibility of Bivens being available to “aliens with no attachment to 
this country” for extraterritorial violations of the Fourth Amendment’s Search Clause. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. The references to Bivens in both opinions are dicta: the statement in Sosa 
is dictum because it was not essential to the conclusion that the ATS was unavailable to remedy 
arbitrary detention, Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768; the statement in Verdugo-Urquidez is dictum because 
that case was a criminal case that (obviously) did not involve any questions of civil liability, 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261. However, there need not be a war of dicta because the Verdugo-
Urquidez Court limited its concerns to the facts of the case—“[u]nder these circumstances, the 
Fourth Amendment has no application.” Id. at 275. Furthermore, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court did 
not rule out the availability of Bivens relief. Id. at 274. Rather, it expressed concern about the 
chilling effect extending Bivens to extraterritorial searches would have on law enforcement. Id.  
 282.  I say “simply” because it is reasonable to assume that the conduct at Abu Ghraib would 
create Bivens liability if committed in the United States. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734–35, 
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Second, any suits by the Abu Ghraib prisoners would arise under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which broadly regulates 
government treatment of prisoners.283 Because the Eighth Amendment 
does not include the same textual limitation on its protection as the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court’s conclusion in Verdugo-Urquidez about 
the Fourth Amendment and “the people”284 should not govern questions 
involving the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. And because the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause broadly regulates the conduct of 
government officers, it is “in respect of our own citizens” and should not 
be barred by the presumption of territorial limitation on domestic law in 
Curtiss-Wright.285 Furthermore, because the prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
were under American authority and control at the time, it would not be 
unreasonable to require government officers to treat them in a manner 
similar to that which applies to prisoners (including aliens) held 
domestically.286 Rather, this would apply the Eighth Amendment equally 
to government agents regardless of where they act. 
Third, the conduct at issue in the Abu Ghraib scandal would very 
likely give rise to Bivens liability if committed against a U.S. citizen or 
alien held in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.287 In Hope v. 
Pelzer, the Supreme Court held that hitching a prisoner to a post for an 
extended time without bathroom breaks was unconstitutionally cruel and 
unusual punishment because there was no valid penological or safety 
interest in restraining him that way.288 While there are obviously factual 
differences between Hope, other cruel and unusual punishment cases, 
and Abu Ghraib, the Abu Ghraib victims could certainly assert that there 
was no legitimate penological interest in stripping them, in forcing them 
into humiliating positions, or in the other types of abuse.289 If the conduct 
739 (2002). 
 283.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; supra Part IV.B. 
 284.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75. 
 285.  299 U.S. at 318; see also supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 286.  See Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial 
Power and the United States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 147, 197 (“If the United 
States exercises sovereign authority over the individual, each provision of the Constitution should 
apply.”). 
 287.  See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (allowing Bivens to aliens with some “attachment 
to this country”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2002). In Yousef the Second 
Circuit treated an Eighth Amendment claim brought by an alien but held in a federal prison on the 
merits, implying that the Eighth Amendment applies to aliens held within the United States. See also 
supra note 195. 
 288.  536 U.S. at 738. 
 289.  Otherwise, the soldiers would not have been convicted at court martial. See supra notes 
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would create constitutional liability if done against either a U.S. citizen 
or an alien held in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, it 
should be appropriate to allow the same liability for conduct taken 
against aliens in the physical and legal custody of United States officers. 
Finally, where allowing a cause of action based on just one of the 
Bivens rationales would allow the victims of unconstitutional conduct by 
U.S. agents to assert a claim (subject to qualified immunity and other 
defenses),290 but requiring the other rationale would preclude that claim 
entirely, a court should be able to allow legitimately aggrieved plaintiffs 
a day in court to present their case.291 Obviously, fairness is not 
determinative, but when, as here, there is a conflict between two of the 
stated rationales for a judicial doctrine, courts should be allowed to 
consider it. 
Therefore, even though Bivens’s vindication rationale does not apply 
because the victims are noncitizens, the particular circumstances in the 
Abu Ghraib scandal should allow extending Bivens on the basis of the 
deterrence rationale. Not only would this be consistent with the Sosa 
majority’s apparent understanding of Bivens, it would ensure that federal 
officers are governed by the same constitutional standards on the 
treatment of prisoners regardless of where they operate. It would allow 
the victims of abuse by U.S. soldiers a chance to seek compensation from 
their abusers.  
 
b. Special factors counseling hesitation against extending Bivens: 
the political question doctrine and the military. Assuming that an 
extraterritorial violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
would support a cause of action under Bivens, we still need to consider 
whether the political question doctrine and the deference that courts 
typically show the military should act as a “special factor[] counseling 
hesitation” in the creation of a Bivens remedy for the Abu Ghraib 
victims.292 Because Bivens is a judicially created remedy, the Court has 
4–6. 
 290. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. But for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority Order immunizing the soldiers, the Abu Ghraib victims would very likely have had a 
cause of action under Iraqi law against their abusers. See CIVIL CODE art. 202 (1951) (Iraq); 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2; supra notes 8 & 13.  
 291. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67–68 (characterizing the extension of Bivens to those 
situations where no other effective remedy was available).  Furthermore, because all incidents of 
torture throughout the world would not involve a U.S. government agent defendant, allowing a cause 
of action here would not extend Bivens to a limitless class of plaintiffs. 
 292. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
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expressed hesitance in extending it when “Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy which it explicitly declare[s] to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective,”293 or when there are “special factors counseling hesitation in 
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”294  
In an opinion by then-Judge Scalia in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, a 
case brought against high-level executive officials challenging the 
Reagan administration’s role in the Nicaraguan Contra situation,295 the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that “the special needs of foreign affairs must 
stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and 
foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign 
subjects causing injury abroad.”296 This is a somewhat specialized 
phrasing of the political question doctrine, under which courts defer to 
the political branches in addressing problems better resolved by those 
branches.297 Because the legislative298 and executive299 branches have 
control of the military, regulating the conduct of soldiers is a prototypical 
situation calling for application of the political question doctrine.300
 293. Id. at 18–19. 
 294. Bivens, 446 U.S. at 396. 
 295. 770 F.2d 202, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 296. Id. at 209. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza sought Bivens relief for alleged 
violations of the Fourth Amendment by guerilla forces allegedly trained by United States citizens. 
See id. at 205. Under the later Supreme Court decisions in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273–75 
(refusing to allow Bivens liability for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment committed 
abroad), and in Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (refusing to apply Bivens liability under a respondeat 
superior theory), the suit in Sanchez-Espinoza would have clearly not been viable.  
 297. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686, 689–90 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); Benjamin Schmidt, Comment, Compensating War Victims 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, 1 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y (Aug. 2004), at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/groups/jilp/Ben.pdf.  
 298. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (“provide for the common [defense]”); id. at cl. 13 (“[t]o 
provide and maintain a Navy”); id. at cl. 14 (“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the Land and Naval forces”); id. at cl. 15 (“[t]o provide for calling forth of the Militia”); id. at cl. 16 
(“[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of 
them as may be employed in the service of the United States”). 
 299. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 300. It is in large part due to the deference traditionally shown the military that courts have 
recognized the so-called Feres doctrine, which generally provides that soldiers cannot use the FTCA 
to sue the United States for injuries arising from activities incident to military service. See Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 625. The Feres 
doctrine has often been justified on the ground that courts should stay out of internal military 
governance. See id. at 627–28. 
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However, would the creation of a judicial remedy interfere with the 
“special needs of foreign affairs” or with the political branches’ control 
of the military? Not in the context of Abu Ghraib. First, the decision in 
Sanchez-Espinoza focused on the political character of the lawsuit and 
the policymaking role of the defendants. 
Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of 
geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter 
the danger of foreign citizens’ using the courts in situations such as this 
to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute 
that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy 
should exist.301
The soldiers implicated in the Abu Ghraib scandal are not 
policymakers, and the courts do not need to protect them to protect the 
formation and execution of foreign or military policy in the same way 
that was necessary in Sanchez-Espinoza. This is because, unlike 
Sanchez-Espinoza, any suits by the Abu Ghraib victims would challenge 
individual conduct, rather than the entire official government policy 
putting the soldiers in the country.302  
 Second, any relief against the soldiers would not “obstruct the 
foreign policy of our government” because the United States has 
condemned the abuse at Abu Ghraib.303 While condemnation does not 
mean the courts should automatically create a judicial remedy for the 
victims of the condemned conduct, the President, Congress, and the 
military’s courts martial have stated that what happened at Abu Ghraib 
was inappropriate.304 That the Executive and Legislative branches have 
refused to defend what happened indicates that allowing a judicial 
remedy would not obstruct a government policy. 
Third, providing a judicial remedy would not interfere with internal 
military governance because the military has already investigated, 
 301. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209 (emphasis added). 
 302. Id. at 204 (describing the suit as a general challenge to Executive support for the 
Nicaraguan Contras). 
 303. Id.; see Global Message (May 6, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2004/05/20040506-1.html (statement by President Bush calling the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib “abhorrent”). 
 304.  See Eric Schmitt & Douglas Jehl, Army Says C.I.A. Hid More Iraqis than It Claimed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A6 (“‘We had a gigantic failure of leadership—one that a year ago, I 
would have said was impossible to have in the United States Army.’” (quoting Representative John 
Kline, Republican of Minnesota)); Global Message, supra note 303; supra notes 4–6 (discussing 
court martial proceedings). 
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reprimanded, and sentenced many of the participants.305 And fourth, 
creating a judicial remedy for past conduct against specified tortfeasors 
would not frustrate whatever efforts the military or Congress may 
undertake to prevent future abuses.306
In summary, because the Abu Ghraib victims cannot sue their 
abusers under Iraqi law,307 they must use U.S. law. Under U.S. law, the 
two primary theories under which they could sue U.S. military personnel 
in their individual capacities are the ATS and Bivens. Courts should have 
no trouble in creating a cause of action for torture under the ATS because 
the Sosa majority adopted a flexible standard that would allow clearly 
defined violations of customary international law to be actionable in U.S. 
courts.308 Based on various treaties and domestic statutes addressing and 
even defining torture, courts should find that the international norm 
against torture is sufficiently clearly defined to allow liability under the 
ATS. 
Whether there should be a Bivens cause of action is a more difficult 
question. This Comment has argued that Bivens should be available 
against the soldiers who participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib because 
one of the principal purposes of the Bivens remedy is to deter federal 
agents from acting unconstitutionally,309 and because foreign and 
military policy would not be frustrated by the imposition of civil liability 
against the soldiers.310
 305. See supra notes 4–6. 
 306. If anything, the imposition of civil liability against the abusers would likely augment 
whatever deterrents the military would otherwise impose by showing other soldiers that they could 
be responsible for damages to the people they may abuse. One Law Review editor suggested that 
exposing soldiers to personal liability would make military recruiting more difficult. While I 
understand the concern, § 1983 and Bivens liability have not proven insurmountable obstacles to the 
recruitment of police officers, FBI agents, or prison guards. Furthermore, I sincerely doubt that 
military recruits join the army so they will be able to abuse people. 
 307. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. 
 308. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766–67 (2004). 
 309. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 392 (1971); see also, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001); United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 310. One practical consideration to be addressed if a court recognizes a cause of action under 
Bivens is the statute of limitations. Because Bivens is an implied remedy it includes no limitations 
period, and courts usually borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury. See Indus. 
Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 1994). Iraq 
has a three-year statute of limitation for tort actions. CIVIL CODE art. 232 (1951) (Iraq). A three year 
statute of limitations is not unreasonable. 
The Iraqi Civil Code, as amended, is still in force. The Law of Administration for the State of 
Iraq for the Transitional Period, the document governing the Coalition Provisional Government, 
2BOR-FIN 8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
420 
 
Moreover, allowing civil relief under the ATS or Bivens would not 
open the floodgates to litigation. First, as federal officers, soldiers would 
be able to assert the defense of qualified immunity.311 Because qualified 
immunity “shield[s] [a government defendant] from liability for [civil 
damages] if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known,’”312 innocent soldiers would be protected. While it is tempting to 
suggest that the soldiers must have known that what they were doing was 
wrong, this is an outsider’s perspective. In any civil suit, the soldiers 
would be able to explain the unique circumstances at Abu Ghraib, and 
qualified immunity may be appropriate. Second, given the fact that the 
United States really is at war, it would be appropriate for a court to 
refuse to hear suits for conduct that would not be compensable under the 
FCA’s combat activities exclusion.313 In the FCA, Congress permitted 
liability to be asserted against the United States for the military’s 
noncombat activities, and where those noncombat activities have clear 
analogues in the civilian prison system, subjecting military personnel to 
the same standards and the same liability as their domestic counterparts 
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 
shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in 
accordance with this Law.” The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period, art. 26 (Mar. 8, 2004); E-mail from M. Lawrence, Iraqi International Law Group, to Scott J. 
Borrowman (Dec. 11, 2004, 03:53 MST) (on file with author).  
Another practical consideration for any suit under either Bivens or the ATS would be where 
the victim could sue. Because the violations occurred in Iraq—even though in a prison wholly 
controlled by the United States—venue would lie in the defendant’s home district under 28 U.S.C. § 
1391 (2004). Because the soldiers are “officer[s] or employee[s] of the United States or an[] agency 
thereof acting . . . under color of legal authority” (that is, because they work for the Department of 
Defense), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) applies. This section allows suit in any district where a defendant 
resides, or even where the plaintiff resides “if no real property is involved in the action.” Id. As to 
the civilian contractors, § 1391(b) applies. This section provides that venue is proper  
in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same 
state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
rise to the claim occurred . . . , or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be 
found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 
Id. While most of the soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal were in the 327th Military Police 
Brigade Company, which is based in Maryland, see Richard A. Serrano, Soldier ‘Bewildered’ over 
Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2004, at A14, the individual soldiers may be residents of other states. 
Also, the civilian contractors could be from anywhere. 
 311. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168–69 
(1992)); supra Part II.B.2.b.2. 
 312. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982)). The language referring to statutory or constitutional rights may support the vindication 
rationale. 
 313. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2004). 
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should not unnecessarily infringe on the United States’ ability to 
prosecute the war. 
C. Individual Private Contractors 
At his sentencing hearing, Specialist Graner testified that “his orders 
came from civilian contractors as well as military intelligence.”314 The 
Taguba Report also indicates that civilian contractors were responsible 
for some of the abuse.315 Because private contractors enjoy immunity 
under Iraqi law similar to that enjoyed by soldiers, any suits against the 
contractors would also need to arise under U.S. law. 
Because Sosa is concerned with whether a norm of customary 
international law is sufficiently clearly defined as to justify the creation 
of a common law cause of action, rather than the identify of the 
defendant, the analysis of the ATS against soldiers applies equally 
against private contractors.316 Therefore, because the international 
consensus condemning torture is clearly established by both domestic 
and international materials, a court should allow suit under the ATS 
against civilian contractors who participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. 
The one wrinkle in determining whether Bivens should be available 
against private contractors is the Supreme Court’s Malesko decision,317 
which many commentators see as precluding Bivens actions against 
private actors.318 However, the core holding of Malesko forbids a Bivens 
remedy based solely on respondeat superior liability.319 The decision 
does not necessarily preclude the assertion of liability under Bivens 
against private individuals acting under federal authority. In Malesko, the 
Court concluded that “if a corporate defendant is available for suit, 
claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual 
directly responsible for the alleged injury.”320 Suing an employer for the 
conduct of an employee would frustrate the deterrence rationale of 
 314. Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6. 
 315. See Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2. 
 316. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766–67 (2004). 
 317. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001). 
 318. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers That 
History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617, 1626 n.36; Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: 
How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 639 n.224 (2004). 
 319. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–73. 
 320. Id. at 71 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) 
(plurality)). 
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Bivens because it would not deter individual violations of the 
Constitution.321 But holding the individual employees—the very people 
capable of violating the Constitution and therefore being deterred by 
Bivens—liable would not frustrate the deterrence rationale.322 It was on 
this analysis that the majority held, “[w]ith respect to the alleged 
constitutional deprivation, [the plaintiff’s] only remedy lies against the 
individual” who injured him (even if he is a private contractor).323
Therefore, the apparent hurdle in Malesko should not prevent 
asserting a cause of action under Bivens against the private contractors 
who participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. Because, in contrast to 
federal officers, civilian contractors would not enjoy qualified immunity, 
suing the civilian contractors is a potentially attractive option.324
Thus, the FCA provides the most efficient method of obtaining 
compensation for the injuries the Abu Ghraib detainees received. 
Because the FTCA’s foreign country exception would bar suit against the 
United States, if any of the detainees wanted to sue for compensation, 
they would need to sue the soldiers and civilian contractors in their 
individual capacities. Such suits should be permitted under the ATS 
because the international consensus against torture is clearly defined by 
both international treaties and other documents, and by domestic 
statutes.325 The question on Bivens liability is somewhat trickier because 
 321. Id. at 69–70. 
 322. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to rule on the Bivens action 
against the employee who refused to let the inmate use the elevator because that claim had been 
dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 65. 
 323. Id. at 72; see CHEMERINKSY, supra note 42, at 610 n.122. 
 324. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168–
69 (1992)). Malesko would bar the assertion of liability against a private contractor’s employer on a 
respondeat superior theory. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–73. Because these corporations share their 
employees’ immunity to suit under Iraqi law, see Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 
(revised), supra note 13, § 4(2), obtaining relief from these corporations requires a little more 
creativity. In a class action suit filed against the Titan Corporation—the employer of one of the 
civilian contractors identified in the Taguba Report—the plaintiffs allege causes of action arising 
under RICO, the ATS, the Constitution, and the Geneva Convention. See Complaint, Al-Rawi v. 
Titan (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (No. 04 CV 1143 R), at http://www.cdi.org/news/law/Al-Rawi-v-
Titan-Complaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). It also raises a number of common law theories, 
including negligent hiring, failure to train, and unjust enrichment, that have their locus in America 
and should therefore be exempt from the immunity to Iraqi law. See id.; Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 
F.Supp.2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004). The most recent action on this case was an order transferring it to 
the Eastern District of Virginia. Saleh v. Titan Corp., No. 04 CV 1143 R(NLS), 2005 WL 668830 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2005). A similar purported class action has also been filed in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia. See Complaint, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2005) (No. 04-
01248). It also asserts causes of action under the ATS, RICO, and common law tort theories. Id.
 325.  See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67. 
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allowing liability would advance the deterrence rationale of the Bivens 
doctrine, but not the vindication rationale. I have argued that because the 
Sosa majority assumes Bivens is available to remedy extraterritorial torts, 
because the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is a broad limitation 
on government conduct, and because the conduct at Abu Ghraib would 
likely give rise to Bivens liability if it had occurred in the United States, 
courts should be able to allow Bivens liability. I have also argued that the 
fact that the defendants would be military personnel should not constitute 
a special factor counseling hesitation against the creation of a Bivens 
remedy against either the soldiers or the private contractors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States should provide civil relief to the victims of the 
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. Doing so would promote the United 
States’ image among the Iraqi people and in the Middle East at large, and 
would therefore aid both our efforts in Iraq and in the prosecution of the 
larger war on terror. It would also reflect compliance with our obligation 
under the Convention Against Torture to “ensure in [our] legal system 
that the victim of an act of torture [can] obtain redress and has an 
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means 
for as full rehabilitation as possible.”326  
The most efficient way of providing these victims compensation is 
through the Foreign Claims Act.327 Under the FCA, victims could go to a 
military claims commission in Iraq and, hopefully with no more than the 
now infamous pictures, obtain a settlement. But many Iraqis see both the 
FCA and court martial proceedings against the offenders as 
 326. Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984, art. 14, 23 I.L.M. 1027. The Senate’s statement on the ratification of the 
Convention indicated that this provision would not be self-executing. See Understanding on the 
Convention Against Torture, supra note 253, at III(1). In other words, Congress stated that the 
Convention would not create a cause of action without further action by Congress. See id. at II(5). 
The TVPA was supposed to be this further action. On the one hand, the TVPA went further than the 
Understanding indicated that Congress would go—it created a cause of action for the victims of 
torture whenever the defendant operated under color of foreign law and regardless of where the 
torture was committed. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. On the other hand, the TVPA was also apparently 
based on the (unfortunately erroneous) conclusion that someone acting under U.S. law would not 
torture. See supra notes 4–10, 265–68 and accompanying text. In any event, by ratifying the 
Convention, the United States has acknowledged its obligation to provide legal remedies for the 
victims of torture. 
 327. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2004). 
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inadequate.328 If the FCA does not provide sufficient compensation, or if 
the victims are interested in suing those who abused them, they must 
assert violations of United States law to avoid the immunity provided 
under Coalition Provisional Authority’s Orders.329 This Comment has 
suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
should allow a cause of action under the ATS because there is broad, 
clear international consensus that torture and abuse of prisoners is 
unlawful. It has also suggested that the statement in Sosa that Bivens 
“now provide[s] damages remedies” for extraterritorial constitutional 
torts330 indicates that the Supreme Court would consider liability on a 
constitutional tort theory like Bivens. 
 Whatever the avenue, providing a remedy to those abused by U.S. 
military personnel and civilian contractors is the right thing to do. 
Convicting the soldiers involved has shown the Iraqi people that our own 
soldiers are not above the law. Providing civil relief to the victims would 
show the Iraqi people that the law serves everyone, even the politically 
unimportant. Hopefully, that would provide the same sort of enthusiasm 
for democracy and the rule of law that the recent elections have.331
Scott J. Borrowman∗ 
 328. See Todd Richissin & Gail Gibson, Iraqis See U.S. Sham as Abuse Trials Open, 
BALTIMORE SUN, June 21, 2004, at 1A; Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis, 
supra note 26 (“‘Our point of view toward the Americans has changed. You can feel the fury inside 
you,’ said Amir Shleman, who lost a brother who was a father of a 7-year-old boy and 13-year-old 
girl. ‘If they treated people like human beings, no one would take up weapons against them.’”).
 329. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. 
 330. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768–69. 
 331. See, e.g., Robert J. Caldwell, Iraq's Triumph; Democracy Trumped Terrorism, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 6, 2005, at G1; Remarks by President Bush, President Congratulates 
Iraqis on Election (Jan. 30, 2005), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2005/01/20050130-2.html. 
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